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Crime-Environment Relationships
and Environmental Justice
Avi Brisman1
INTRODUCTION
As a concept, environmental justice has always eluded specific or
restrictive definition.2 It has been commonly understood as “the pursuit of
equal justice and equal protection under the law for all environmental
statutes and regulations without discrimination based on race, ethnicity,
and/or socioeconomic status”3 or as “the fair treatment and meaningful
involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or
income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement
of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”4 Recent efforts, however,
have been undertaken to enlarge the concept of environmental justice, as
well as the scope of the environmental justice movement’s goals. For
example, Lynch and Stretsky observe that the environmental justice
movement has grown to include a wide range of viewpoints and agendas,
each based on different environmental concerns.5 Likewise, White
distinguishes between environmental justice, which he describes as “the
distribution of environments among peoples and the impacts of particular
social practices on specific populations” where “the focus of analysis is on
human health and well-being, and on how these are affected by particular
types of production and consumption,” and ecological justice, which he
defines as “the relationship of human beings, more generally, to the rest of
the natural world” (in effect, the health of the biosphere, the quality of the
planetary environment, and the rights of other species).6
This article builds on a more expansive notion of environmental justice—
one that is concerned not only with the distribution of environmental
hazards across diverse classes and races but with “social transformation
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directed toward meeting human needs and enhancing the quality of life—
economic equality, health care, shelter, human rights, species preservation,
and democracy—using resources sustainably.”7 This article agrees that
“[e]nvironmental problems . . . remain inseparable from other social
injustices such as poverty, racism, sexism, unemployment, urban
deterioration, and the diminishing quality of life resulting from corporate
activity”8 and employs a theory of environmental justice concerned with a
wide range of issues—one that links human oppression with environmental
harms and that sees environmental oppression as connected to other forms
of oppression. More specifically, this article proposes a way to further
broaden the concept of environmental justice by examining the complex
relationships between crime and the environment and arguing that such
relationships provide the underlying structure on which the environmental
justice movement continues to build and be built.
While the hope is that this article will appeal to a broad audience, it is
written with three groups of readers in mind: (1) advocates, policymakers,
practitioners, researchers, and students of environmental justice in particular
and environmental law more generally; (2) advocates, policymakers,
practitioners, researchers, and students interested in and working with issues
of criminal law and criminal justice; and (3) “green criminologists,” as well
as other criminologists and students of criminology interested in the
relationships between crime and the environment. The goal is twofold: (1)
to allow more individuals to view their work as environmental justice,
thereby providing for new avenues of cooperation and collaboration, and (2)
to offer potential avenues of inquiry for criminologists interested in green
issues, as well as for those concerned with matters of morality and blame,
responsibility and injustice, crime and punishment, and unregulated power,
corporate misconduct, and governmental indifference.9
Part I offers two examples of the interactions between crime and the
environment. First, it distinguishes between two notions of harm in the
context of relationships between crime and the environment: the “legal-
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procedural approach” or “corporate perspective,” and the “socio-legal
approach” or “environmental justice perspective.” Next, it highlights
another linkage between crime and the environment: the analysis of
criminal patterns and proclivities within built environments.
From here, the first section of Part II delves into the wide range of ways
in which crime and the environment interact, beginning with a broaderthan-usual take on the legal-procedural approach and containing subsections
on major environmental laws, lesser-known environmental laws, and
criminal laws with unintended environmental impacts. While what this
section considers “environmental” is quite expansive, the various
subsections are united in that they all deal with unauthorized acts or
omissions that violate the law and are therefore subject to criminal
prosecution and sanctions. While some of the laws discussed are more
directly related to the environment (however “environment” may be
conceived) than others, infringement of all of these laws affect the
“environment.” Harm, then, is defined by the fact of transgression.
The second section of Part II is closely linked to the first. It deals with
the unintended negative consequences of efforts to protect the environment
with legal regimes—in particular, the unintended adverse criminal and
environmental corollaries of major environmental laws. It also discusses a
scenario in which a regulatory regime fails to allow environmental benefits
from transpiring.
The third section of Part II presents the second concept of harm, the
socio-legal approach. This section begins with a discussion of efforts to
broaden the concept of harm and provides three examples of legal harms—
harms that are not defined by the simple fact of transgression but by their
actual negative environmental impact, such as Hurricane Katrina,
“ecocide,” and animal abuse and cruelty.
The fourth section of Part II is closely linked to the third section. Here,
the consideration is not of unintended consequences of a legal regime, but
how the failure of legal regimes to control certain behavior results in
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individuals taking matters into their own hands—what are, essentially,
responses to legal harms or “crimes in the name of the environment.”
The fifth section of Part II represents a shift away from considerations of
different concepts of harm and how such concepts interface with efforts to
protect the environment. In contrast to the previous four sections, this
section examines spatial aspects of crime and the impact of the design of
physical structures of building space and the quantity and nature of green
space on crime. This section also examines the reverse relationship—the
the impact of fear of crime in the environment, as well as the effect of fear
of crime on the environment—on one’s attitude toward and interactions
with one’s physical and natural surroundings, including one’s desire and
willingness to act in environmentally beneficent ways.
It bears mention that Part II does not pretend to offer a comprehensive
review of all connections or possible connections between crime and the
environment.10 What follows is intended as a representative sample rather
than an exhaustive list. In addition, this list should not be interpreted as a
ranking system—the issues discussed first should not be regarded as
somehow more important than those mentioned later on—nor should the
relationships between crime and the environment described at the beginning
of this part be viewed as stronger than those articulated towards the end.
The organization of this part is simply an attempt to provide a broad survey
of issues and associations to those unaccustomed to analyses of the
relationships between crime and the environment, and to offer a new way of
grouping such relationships to those with more significant background.
Finally, Part III concludes by showing how both environmental justice
scholars and criminologists have called for inter- and cross-disciplinary
investigations of environmental harm. It argues that research exposing the
linkages between crime and the environment can address these appeals for
conversation and collaboration.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CRIME AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
Criminologists and other scholars interested in the relationships between
crime and the environment often focus on the notion of harm and tend to
frame their conception of harm in two ways. The legal-procedural approach
defines “the parameters of harm by referring to practices which are
proscribed by the law”11 and “privileges the criminal law in the definition of
what constitutes serious social injury.”12 Thus, the legal-procedural
approach considers laws regarding air and water pollution, soil quality,
deforestation, conservation of natural resources, and protection of
biodiversity and frequently refers to violations thereof as “environmental
crimes.” The socio-legal approach, on the other hand, “conceives harm in
terms of damaging practices which may or may not be encapsulated under
existing criminal law”13 and “has facilitated the investigation of phenomena
such as white-collar crime and denial of human rights by the adoption of
conceptions of harm which are not limited by definitions solely generated
by the state.”14 Thus, the socio-legal approach contemplates the wide range
of activities and practices that may be legal, but are nonetheless
environmentally destructive, such as: using animals in tests and
experiments, vivisection,15 sprawl, the sale of unnecessary and dangerous
pesticides and pharmaceuticals banned in developed nations but lacking
regulation in developing countries, driving sport utility vehicles (SUVs), the
policies leading up to and the responses to Hurricane Katrina, and conflict
and war—activities, practices, or “offenses” that may also be referred to as
“environmental crimes.”
Other scholars use different terminology to describe the two approaches,
but the conceptual divisions remain effectively the same. For example,
Lynch and Stretsky distinguish between two perspectives on “green crime”:
the “corporate perspective” (akin to the legal-procedural approach) and the
“environmental justice perspective” (similar to the socio-legal approach).
For them, the corporate perspective recognizes the influence of corporate
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power structures on the creation or delineation of those unauthorized acts or
omissions that violate the law and are therefore subject to criminal
prosecution and sanctions.16 In contrast to the corporate perspective, which
Lynch and Stretsky describe as “a very precise, exact and limiting definition
of what can be considered a ‘crime,’”17 the environmental justice
perspective contemplates and includes acts or omissions that may not
constitute a violation of an existing form of law, but which result in, or
possess the potential to result in, environmental and human harm.18
While a broader consideration of harm via the socio-legal approach has
helped expand inquiries into the relationships between crime and the
environment,19 harm-based (or harm-focused) investigations do not
encompass the full range of connections between crime and the
environment. For example, the term environmental criminology frequently
refers to the study of the spatial aspects of crime, such as where, when, and
how offenses take place and how far offenders will travel to commit their
crimes.20
Consistent with this research, crime prevention through
environmental design (CPTED) focuses on developing strategies that
influence individuals’ calculus in deciding whether to commit particular
criminal acts, such as a perceived risk of detection and apprehension.21
Related to environmental criminology and CPTED is work by Kuo,
Sullivan, and Taylor among others at the Human-Environment Research
Laboratory at the University of Illinois who have explored how everyday,
unspectacular green spaces can positively affect mood and attitudes, thereby
improving neighbor interactions, decreasing domestic violence, and
reducing crime.22 This different kind of environmental design is oriented
toward criminals rather than crime23—toward features of the natural and
social environment that affect psycho-social conditions rather than
opportunities. Neither environmental criminology, nor CPTED, nor the
work at the Human-Environment Research Laboratory contemplate harm to
the natural environment and whether such activities and practices are
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statutorily proscribed. But all constitute examples of the relationships
between crime and the environment.24

II. TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CRIME AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
A. The Legal-Procedural Approach or Corporate Perspective25 to
Environmental Harm
1. Major Environmental Laws
In Part I, I made use of the terms “environmental crimes” and “green
crimes.” Du Rées employs the term “environmental criminal law” to refer
to the use of penal legislation or criminal law to protect the environment
and control environmentally hazardous activities.26 As she explains,
because environmental crimes are “assumed, unlike many other forms of
criminalized behaviour, to be determined by rational calculation and are
generally the result of a premeditated decision . . . [by those] groups of
people of high social standing who feel considerable loyalty towards the
legal system at the general level,”27 the goal of environmental criminal law
is to establish sufficiently severe sanctions for committing environmental
crimes so as to deter potential offenders.28
Regardless of the particular term employed—“environmental crime,”
“green crime,” or “environmental criminal law”—this particular
relationship between crime and the environment is by no means new. As
South describes, “[i]n the modern period of industrialization, the ways in
which early legislators sought to deal with environmental matters were
through public health or resource statutes, in some cases through civil codes
and then in other cases through the criminal law.”29 Today, in the United
States, almost every major federal environmental law on the books—every
well-known, far-reaching law that seeks to protect air, water and soil
quality, conserve natural resources, and ensure biodiversity—contains some
sort of provision for criminal sanctions for failure to abide by the
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requirements set forth in the statute.30 Thus, many statutes31 provide for
both civil and criminal penalties (fines, in the case of the former, and fines
and/or imprisonment in the case of the latter32), such as: the Toxic
Substances Control Act,33 which deals with the manufacture and use of
toxic substances; the Clean Air Act,34 the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act35), and the Solid Waste
Disposal Act (as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act),36 all of which address waste discharge; the Endangered Species Act;37
and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act38 and the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act,39 which attempt to protect
natural resources and/or biodiversity; the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act;40 the Noise Control Act;41 and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act.42 In addition, Section 202 of the
National Environmental Policy Act, also known as the Pollution
Prosecution Act of 1990,43 requires the Environmental Protection Agency,
which administers many of the major environmental statutes,44 to employ
criminal investigators to track criminal polluters.45 Other statutes provide
for civil penalties that include both fines and imprisonment46 as well as civil
penalties in the form of fines only.47 Indeed, the entire purpose of the
Superfund (officially known as the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act)48 is to impose liability on
release of hazardous substances and provide financial redress for clean-up
costs.49
2. Lesser-Known Environmental Laws
Often neglected within the legal-procedural approach are laws that while
not labeled “environmental” by state actors (i.e., they are not contained in
the same title or section or discussion of laws regarding air and water
pollution, soil quality, deforestation, conservation of natural resources, and
protection of biodiversity), would fall under a more expansive definition of
environmental. Such acts or omissions still constitute a violation of an
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existing form of law and, thus, cannot be considered part of the socio-legal
approach or environmental justice perspective. Rather, they might be
referred to as lesser-known environmental laws (or “less-often-consideredenvironmental” laws)—laws that, like the more well-known environmental
laws pertaining to air and water pollution, soil quality, deforestation,
conservation of natural resources, and protection of biodiversity, attempt to
broaden or enforce rights, reduce neglect, and diminish harms, and contain
civil and/or criminal penalties that include fines and/or imprisonment.
At the federal level in the United States, examples of such lesser-known
environmental laws would include the Federal Meat Inspection Act
(1958);50 the Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter Act (1958) (also
known as the Humane Slaughter Act);51 the Horse Protection Act (1970);52
Wild Horses and Burros Act (1971);53 the Food Security Act (1985);54 the
Health Research Extension Act (1985);55 and the Pet Protection Act
(1990),56 among others.57 While the Animal Welfare Act (1966, as
amended in 1970, 1976, 1985, and 1990)58 might also be included in this
list, it has recently shed some of its obscurity with the case of Michael Vick.
Vick, the disgraced former National Football League quarterback for the
Atlanta Falcons, who received much attention for his involvement in
dogfighting, was initially accused of violating the Animal Welfare Act,59 as
well as violations of 18 U.S.C. §1952—interstate and foreign travel or
transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises.60 He eventually pleaded
guilty to “Conspiracy to Travel in Interstate Commerce in Aid of Unlawful
Activities and to Sponsor a Dog in an Animal Fighting Venture in Violation
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371,”61 and was sentenced to
twenty-three months in prison.62
States also possess lesser-known environmental laws. For example, all
fifty states possess some form of animal anticruelty statutes.63 At the time
of this writing, forty-nine states prohibit cockfighting.64 To return to the
example of Vick, in addition to serving a federal sentence, Vick still faces
state charges in Virginia for unlawfully beating, torturing, killing, or
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causing dogs to fight other dogs, and for engaging in or promoting
dogfighting.65 Some municipalities have banned certain breeds of dogs66 or
required owners to use muzzles and/or short leashes in public.67 Thirtythree states and the District of Columbia hold dog owners legally liable if
their pets maim or kill, with Texas having enacted the harshest criminal
penalties for dog owners whose dogs seriously injure a person while off
their leashes.68
3. Criminal Laws with Unintended Environmental Impacts
In addition to violations of major federal and state environmental laws
(such as those regulating air and water pollution, soil quality, deforestation,
conservation of natural resources, and protection of biodiversity) and
violations of lesser-known environmental laws (such as those pertaining to
animal cruelty), some violations of certain criminal laws and policies can
bring about unintended adverse environmental consequences. Whereas
these laws and policies are meant to regulate aspects of society that are not
associated with the natural environment, they may wind up having a strong
impact on the environment. Two examples, both pertaining to illicit drugs,
will suffice here.
First, the production of methamphetamine can cause serious
environmental damage:
Meth[amphetamine] production . . . poses grave environmental and
health concerns by creating toxic, hazardous waste endangering the
environment and surrounding community. Meth cooks may spill
chemicals and/or dump toxic residue near the drug lab where it
contaminates the soil, groundwater, and kills vegetation; meth
production generates toxic gaseous vapors that cause adverse
health effects to the meth operators, their families, and law
enforcement, and creates a nearly invisible residue that lingers
within the walls of a meth lab home where it poses serious health
risks to unsuspecting residents, visitors and guests.69
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Second, in a more elaborate and international account, del Olmo
describes how the cultivation and production of cocaine results in four
ecological impacts in Bolivia (especially the Chapare region), Colombia,
and Peru: (1) prior to initiating coca cultivation, the deforestation of
thousands of hectares of fragile, low tropic jungle near rivers, often with the
system of burning as a land-clearing method; (2) erosion due to the lack of
soil production in zones of high rain; (3) contamination of water due to the
indiscriminate and intensive use of pesticides, fertilizers, and highly
contaminating chemicals used to produce basic cocaine paste; and (4) the
destruction of valuable genetic flora and fauna resources.70 In addition, she
reveals the flip-side of the problem of illicit drug production—the
ecological impact of drug destruction through government eradication
programs employing herbicides. “Drug crop destruction via eradication
programs is a priority in the U.S. war on drugs,” she writes.71 While such
eradication may be achieved by a number of different means, “the most
effective, although with greater environmental and ecological impact, is
aerial fumigation with herbicides,”72 including Paraquat or Gramaxone,
Glyphosate or “Roundup,” and 2,4-D (more notoriously known as the
principal component of Agent Orange).73 This point is echoed by South,
who claims:
In a different kind of war—the current “war on drugs,” the use of
herbicidal chemical sprays against plant-drug crops in various
Central and Latin American countries has also damaged more than
just the original targets, i.e. coca bushes and marijuana plantations.
These anti-drug crop sprays have, of course, also affected other
crops, introduced contamination into the food chain and water
table, and been linked to a variety of health problems, birth defects,
still births and so on.74
Thus, South and del Olmo maintain, while illicit drug production has
resulted in significant ecological problems, so has drug crop destruction.
And with “illicit drug cultivation provid[ing] the only possible means of
survival for many peasants living in extreme poverty and isolation, lacking
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opportunities available in more highly developed areas and thus with no
other alternative means of income generation available,”75 the result has
been that illicit drug production itself has actually increased appreciably
since eradication programs began.76 For del Olmo, the ecological problems
caused by illicit drug production and drug crop destruction both merit
attention. But she stresses the significance of the latter—which “poses
more questions, and should raise more concerns, because of the indifference
of governments toward the major environmental and human health
problems which pesticide use and misuse produce.”77
In conclusion, under the legal-procedural approach, the federal and/or
state governments determine harm by defining proscribed behaviors that are
punished by fines and/or imprisonment. Some of the activities or practices
pertain to more obvious aspects of the environment, for example, air quality
and water quality. Some of the activities or practices pertain to lesser
obvious aspects of the environment, such as prohibitions on cockfighting
and dogfighting, and various regulations regarding the treatment of animals
used for research or food. And finally, some of the activities or practices
such as cooking methamphetamine and the “War on Drugs” pertain to
criminal phenomena that have nothing directly to do with the environment
but which nonetheless affect the environment when committed in a certain
way in a certain place. Despite the diversity of these examples, all in all,
the mechanisms of these environment-crime/crime-environment
relationships are the same in each instance: a violation of the laws results in
an environmental harm, is considered a crime, and is punished as such.
B. The Unintended Consequences of Regulatory Regimes: “Environmental
Black Markets” and Unrealized Environmental Benefits
1. Regulatory Regime Produces Unintended Criminogenic Effects
According to Brack, “‘environmental crime’ occurs when individuals and
companies deliberately flout environmental laws and regulations for profit
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or power.”78 “International environmental crime,” he continues, occurs
“[w]here these activities lead to . . . transboundary or global environmental
problems.”79
These definitions would seem to describe the phenomena discussed in the
previous section, such as when individuals or companies, in an effort to
decrease costs, “negligently introduce[] into a sewer system or into a public
owned treatment works any pollutant or hazardous substance which such
person[s] knew or reasonably should have known could cause personal
injury or property damage” in violation of the Clean Water Act,80 or simply
fail to install the Best Available Control Technologies to reduce emissions
from a facility, as required by the Clean Air Act.81 But Brack uses
environmental crime in a broader sense to refer to the side effects of
policies aimed at protecting the environment,82 such as when illegal
activities result from lack of appropriate regulation,83 when there is a failure
to enforce existing laws,84 or when regulations create “environmental black
markets”85 for illegal disposal of hazardous wastes86 or illegal products such
as endangered species of wild flora and fauna (orchids, birds, tropical fish,
ivory, animal pelts, reptile skins), timber and timber products, and ozonedepleting substances.87 This subsection focuses on the emergence of
environmental black markets, or “criminogenic markets,” to use Szasz’s
phrase, that resulted from the passing of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA).88
RCRA is a cradle-to-grave statute that mandates comprehensive tracking
and management mechanisms of hazardous wastes from their origination to
final disposal. But as Szasz—writing in the mid-1980s, ten years after
RCRA’s enactment—explains, the system created a situation “in which
corporations, some at the heart of the American economy, discharge their
regulatory obligations under RCRA by entering into direct contractual
relationships with firms dominated by organized crime.”89 According to
Szasz, “[t]he fact that RCRA not only cannot prevent illegal hazardous
waste dumping but has also attracted organized crime participation in illegal
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hazardous waste activity suggests that the concept of criminogenesis may
be fruitfully extended to regulatory processes as well.”90 Szasz continues
by arguing that
[a]nalysis of the formation of RCRA legislation shows that
corporate generators of hazardous waste were instrumental in
securing a regulatory structure that would prove highly attractive
to and well suited for organized crime participation. In other
words, corporate generators of hazardous waste are deeply
implicated in the creation of conditions that made their relationship
to organized crime possible.91
This is what South refers to as “criminogenic policy-making.”92
While Szasz asserts that “the boundary between organized crime and
legitimate business is, at points, somewhat ambiguous,”93 he stops short of
arguing that corporate generators of hazardous waste were complicit with
organized crime in the formation of RCRA:
The cohesiveness and unanimity of generator intervention to
shape RCRA legislation certainly shows that they intended
something. Nonetheless, no evidence was found in the research
discussed here to support an argument that generators consciously
intended to create a context for organized crime entry into the
industrial waste disposal business, or even that they understood
that such an outcome was possible. Rather, it appears much more
likely that they acted out of a general tendency to resist full social
responsibility for the “externalities,” the environmental and public
health consequences, of industrial production, and that they did not
much care what, if any, unintended consequences would follow.
….
Analysis of the formation of hazardous waste disposal
regulations captures such a criminogenic structure at the moment
of its formation. In the mid-1970s, corporations faced the prospect
of new legislation that would force them to bear the responsibility
and cost of environmentally safe disposal of massive amounts of
hazardous waste. They responded with a legislative campaign that
effectively limited their liability. The regulatory structure they
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advocated would prove to be highly vulnerable to the commission
of disposal crime, but these crimes would be committed by others,
not by the generators themselves. Even if generators did not intend
this outcome, they were well served by it because illegal disposal
activity effectively slowed the pace of change and cushioned the
shock of transition from an unregulated to an increasingly
regulated context.94
What Szasz identifies is a system of environmental laws and regulations
intended to provide a social good and protect against environmental
catastrophe, but which imposes significant costs on businesses and runs
counter to the corporate goal of maximizing profits.95 While many
corporations do play by the rules, others regard attainment of the corporate
goal as achievable only by breaking the law. As Brack laments, “[t]oo
often, corporations choose to do business with whomever can provide
services at cut-rate prices.”96 But in Szasz’s view, the relationship between
illegitimate and legitimate business is more complex. It “is one of mutually
beneficial interdependence,”97 or as South maintains, organized crime and
legitimate businesses exist in “expanding symbiotic relationships” in the
hugely profitable area of illegal waste transfer and disposal98—suggesting
an inextricable link between the environment and crime.
2. Regulatory Regime Blocks Certain Environmental Benefits from
Occurring
Whereas regulations and policies aimed at protecting the environment
can produce criminogenic side effects (violations of these laws due to
challenges with enforcement or lax enforcement, or environmental black
markets for illegal products or illegal disposal of hazardous wastes),
sometimes the reverse process occurs: a legal regime precludes a more
environmentally sustainable practice from transpiring. For example, in
North Dakota, where agriculture remains the largest component of the
state’s economy, scab—a fungus also known as Fusarium head blight—has
destroyed thousands of acres of wheat.99 Hemp, which is used in clothes,
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lotions, snack bars, car door panels, and insulation, would survive quite
nicely in the rocky soil and cool, wet climate of North Dakota. It does not
require fertilizers or pesticides and would provide a viable alternative for
North Dakota’s crop rotation.100 But hemp is treated like marijuana because
it contains tetrahydrocannabinol and, thus, is banned under the Controlled
Substances Act of 1970.101 Recognizing the economic and environmental
benefits of hemp cultivation,102 legislatures in Maine, Montana, North
Dakota, West Virginia, and other states have passed bills allowing farmers
to grow industrial hemp.103 But farmers have not undertaken cultivation of
industrial hemp out of fear that such efforts, even with state licenses, would
violate the Controlled Substances Act.104
It bears mention that “[i]n the wide-open spaces of this state [North
Dakota], an independent streak often runs through the politics, especially
when it comes to federal mandates. But the fight over hemp is not political
or philosophical . . . . It lacks any counterculture wink, any hint of the fear
some hemp opponents express that those trying to legalize hemp secretly
hope to open the door to the plant’s more potent cousin.”105 According to
Roger Johnson, the North Dakota state agriculture commissioner,
hemp fields would be the worst places to hide marijuana. Under
[North Dakota] state rules . . . such fields must be accessible for
unannounced searches, day or night, and crops would be tested by
the state. Also . . . a field of hemp and marijuana would crosspollinate, leaving the drug less potent.106
Despite arguments from individuals like Johnson, growing crops of
industrial hemp is currently not an option in places such as North Dakota,
thereby illustrating a situation in which a regulatory regime impedes an
environmental boon.
In conclusion, the legal regimes discussed in the first section vary in their
success in protecting the environment and reducing the risk of
environmental harm and degradation. And their ability to achieve their
goals may not always be linked to the deterrent effect of the criminal and/or
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civil penalties provided for in each of these statutes or to the likelihood of
imposition of such penalties (which also tend to vary by statute and by
administrator). Rather, as this section has attempted to show, the
regulations’ efficacy may be dependent on whether, and to what extent,
certain environmental black markets or criminogenic markets emerge and
operate. In situations akin to the North Dakota scab problem, statutes may
prove to be a successful deterrent, but the behavior deterred would be
beneficial to the environment, not destructive.
C. Environmental or Green Crimes from a Socio-Legal Approach or
Environmental Justice Perspective107
In 1990, in what is generally regarded as the first use of the term green
criminology,108 Lynch argued that while criminologists had been examining
various environmental hazards and crimes for some time, “[a] revitalized
approach to crime . . . [could] be framed within the awakening
environmentalism of the 1990s.”109
Lynch foresaw a merging of
environmentalism, radicalism, and humanism to construct a “green
criminology,” which would include an examination of a wide range of
unauthorized acts or omissions that violate laws and are therefore subject to
criminal prosecution and sanctions (such as laws and treaties designed to
promote sound environmental practices and prevent the destruction of
human, animal, and plant life). Green criminology would also include the
study of acts or omissions that may not constitute a violation of an existing
form of law but which result in, or potentially result in, environmental and
human harm (such as governmental and corporate practices and social
trends that misuse the environment or result in hunger and homelessness).110
Lynch made clear that his list was not exhaustive and that scholars might
approach their research by analyzing environmental and wildlife laws,
regulations, and international treaties; investigating the environmental,
human health, and social harms (both local and global) resulting from
chemical and pesticide manufacturing, as well as the unsafe working
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conditions created by chemical and pesticide manufacture; engaging in
national and comparative study of environmental politics and power;
exploring “drug dumping” in developing nations; and exposing global
political and economic structures that allow for the exportation of
environmental hazards such as toxic waste from core nations to the
periphery.111
Since then, green criminologists have followed Lynch’s lead,
significantly expanding his list of suggestions. For example, South and
Beirne have recently encouraged exploration of:
the abuse and exploitation of ecological systems, including nonhuman animals; corporate disregard for damage to land or air or
water quality; profiteering from environmentally damaging trades
and practices that destroy lives and leave a legacy of damage for
subsequent generations; military actions in war that adversely
affect the environment and animals; new challenges to
international treaties and to the emerging field of bio-ethics, such
as bio-piracy; illicit markets in nuclear materials; and legal
monopolization of natural resources (for example, privatization,
patenting of natural products, and so on) leading to divisions
between the resource-rich and the resource-impoverished and the
prospects of new forms of conflict, harm, injury, damage and
crime.112
Because green criminology suggests the reappraisal of traditional notions
of criminal offenses and harmful behaviors, while reexamining the role that
societies (including corporate and government actors) play in generating
harms to the environment,113 the list of what could come within this
purview is considerable. The legal-procedural approach, discussed in Part
II.A and B, limits the inquiry to the study of laws designed to promote
sound environmental practices that protect the destruction of human,
animal, and plant life. The first two sections of this part add to the legalprocedural approach by including both the study of criminal laws whose
violations result in environmental destruction and the examination of
criminal laws that proscribe activities that would benefit the environment.
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This section provides three examples of acts or omissions that fall within
the socio-legal approach—acts or omissions that may not constitute a
violation of an existing form of law but may result in, or potentially result
in, environmental and human harm.
1. The “Crime” of Hurricane Katrina
The damage caused by Hurricane Katrina is frequently referred to as a
natural disaster.114 But for many individuals who experienced the event and
for countless more who observed its aftermath, Katrina was “unnatural” and
“self-inflicted”115—as much the result of human choices as geology or
hydrology.116 Some who make this claim point to the hurricane itself,
which might not have existed or might not have been as intense without the
influence of global warming.117 Others single out “unwise coastal
development” (in the case of Dauphin Island)118 or assert that “[t]he steady
destruction of coastal wetlands by residential development and years of oil
and gas drilling” destroyed marshes and barrier islands that once provided
protection from the waters of the Mississippi Delta and Gulf of Mexico.119
And still others cry that pork-barrel projects in Congress diverted funds
away from measures that would have prevented floods.120 While there is
some disagreement as to the protective role of barrier islands and marshland
(where the floodwater that caused the most damage came from) and to
which extent lost wetlands would have actually helped to mitigate this
damage,121 the prevailing sense is that the catastrophe was avoidable.
Such viewpoints illustrate the socio-legal approach because acts or
omissions (especially those on the part of the government) that did not
constitute a violation of an existing form of law122 still resulted in
(considerable) environmental and human harm.123 But some are unwilling
to couch Katrina in the terms offered by the socio-legal approach. Rather,
they attempt to call greater attention to the injustices that transpired by
appropriating the language of the legal-procedural approach. For example,
the John Jay College Student Work Brigade (a group of New Yorkers
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comprised of students and faculty from the John Jay College of Criminal
Justice, members of Iglesia San Romero de Las Américas-UCC, and
members of Da Urban Butterflies Youth Leadership Development Program
of the Dominican Women’s Development Center) conducted research in
post–Katrina New Orleans and declared in its “Manifesto of New Orleans”:
While talking with the people in New Orleans, we realized that
what happened in New Orleans was not a “natural disaster—it was
murder!” Contrary to the government’s Christian theocratic belief
(ironic, since we visited during Holy Week), we learned that what
happened in New Orleans was not a punishment from God, but a
failure of the government to act. This was a crime against
humanity. Much of the damage and loss of life caused by the
hurricane could have been prevented with better planning and
better use of governmental resources.
On the eve of the second anniversary of this tragedy, we learned
that the failure to act was another manifestation of the Bush
doctrine: illegal but legitimate. The definition of a crime was
filtered through the ideology of an elitist creed, letting us see the
lack of democracy in our political system. We have no
reservations when we say that this was a well-calculated terrorist
action that exposed and magnified the crime against humanity and
the genocide that were already present in New Orleans. From this
knowledge, our political consciousness awoke.124
This formulation uses the vernacular of the legal-procedural approach, but
calls into question the elements that generally constitute a criminal offense
(actus reus, mens rea, a harmful result caused by a defendant’s act or
omission, as well as some degree of concurrence or proof of certain
attendant circumstances). In so doing, the John Jay College Student Work
Brigade offers a scathing commentary on the “law” as a monolithic entity.
Far from a reflection of social consensus designed to ensure fairness and to
equitably and justly resolve disputes,125 the “law” is seen as an “elitist
creed”—an apparatus that perpetuates and exacerbates existing inequalities
and that serves only the interests of a special, privileged class.126
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Regardless of whether one finds such standpoints convincing, and
regardless of whether one prefers to consider Katrina along the lines of the
socio-legal approach or in the terms set forth by the John Jay College
Student Work Brigade, Katrina spurred and continues to create other
linkages between crime and the environment. While such connections
operate under a legal-procedural approach of harm, they merit brief mention
here. For example, some displaced by Katrina now live in communities
without the crime that plagued the poorer sections of New Orleans.127 For
these individuals, their new neighborhoods may lack the pace, culture, and
diverse offerings of the Big Easy, but their new homes may also offer a
change from the violence and demands of pre–Katrina New Orleans. For
others, a different phenomenon may have transpired. Recall the images of
rampant looting that took place after disaster set in128—much of it
understandable in light of the need for food, water, and other provisions.129
Psychologists have speculated that the looting may have produced a
“cascade,” whereby new definitions of normative behavior were created.130
As one psychologist explains, “People who would never dream of stealing a
TV set might be inclined to do so if they first stole some water, bread,
cereal, milk, and so on.”131 This is not to suggest that everyone who looted
in the immediate aftermath of Katrina has since become an electronics thief.
But for some, especially those who stayed in New Orleans or who returned
shortly thereafter, the initial transgression may have provided sufficient
impetus for continued criminal activity. Combined with the paucity of jobs
and high rents, that first taste of crime might have precipitated subsequent
criminal events.132
In sum, while the etiology of crime—on either a society-wide or
individual level—can rarely be reduced to one or two reasons or factors,
Katrina has generated a number of linkages between crime and the
environment. It represents not only a different approach or perspective to
the issue of harm from what was articulated in the first section (i.e.,
practices that are proscribed by law), but serves as an event that has
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impacted individuals’ interactions with crime in both positive and negative
ways.
2. “Ecocide” Under the Socio-Legal Approach to Harm
Ecocide refers to the process whereby an organism destroys its ecosystem
through its own intentional or unintentional actions.133 While the term can
apply to biological processes, increasingly it is used interchangeably with
eco-war to describe human activities and practices that cause widespread
damage to habitats and environments.134 Whereas the terms ecocide or ecowar are sometimes employed broadly to describe “state-sanctioned
destruction of an ecosystem”135 (seemingly any adverse impacts caused by
humans’ industrial, manufacturing, or technological processes136), at other
times, the terms may be used in the context of military conflicts—either as a
result of conflict, as a result of the preparation for conflict, as well as the
reason for conflict. This subsection focuses on the narrower notion of
ecocide.
Few would dispute that military conflict and war have brought about
environmental damage.137 For example, Lebanon is still trying to cope with
the “toxic stains of war” (the collateral damage), including environmental
devestation, from the attacks by Israel on the Shiite militant group
Hezbollah in the summer of 2006. According to one report, “[i]n the worst
single incident [of the attacks], Israel bombed an electricity generating
station at Jiye, south of Beirut, in July of 2006, sending 15,000 tonnes of oil
into the sea—the most severe oil slick ever seen in the eastern
Mediterranean.”138 Whereas the damage incurred by Lebanon was
incidental to Israel’s military strategy, during the first Gulf War (Operation
Desert Storm), Iraqi troops engaged in ecocide by deliberately dumping 400
million gallons of crude oil into the Persian Gulf and by setting fire to
Kuwaiti oil fields during their retreat out of Kuwait.139
Preparation for conflict, violence, and war can also adversely impact the
natural environment. Military sonar use by U.S. and NATO ships
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frequently result in mass stranding events, whale deaths, and other harm to
marine mammals.140 Seager asserts that
militaries are the biggest threat to the environmental welfare of the
planet. . . . In the United States, hundreds of towns have been
poisoned by the military; places such as Fernald, Ohio; Hanford,
Washington; or Rocky Flats, Colorado, have become symbols not
only of environmental catastrophe but of the flagrant abuses that
derive from a hands-off military environmental policy.141
Seager adds that “the Canadian government, usually considered to be a bit
player in global militarism, spends twelve times as much on the military as
it does on the environment,”142 and contends that:
the price of military expansion everywhere in the world is
environmental neglect, increasing social inequality, and
deterioration in the daily quality of life for hundreds of thousands
of people. . . . Militaries, multinationals, and governments are on
an unrestrained global wilding spree, one that cannot be halted by a
few new law-and-order regulations. Environmental regulations are
necessary, but not sufficient, precisely because they leave intact
the culture of institutions of destruction. Strategies for real
environmental protection have to be rooted in understanding how
race, gender, and class privilege are integral to the functioning of
these institutions.143
Aside from environmental degradation resulting from conflict or the
preparation for conflict (military use of sonar, the diversion of funds from
protecting the environment and rectifying environmental wrongs), conflict,
violence, and war may also occur over environmental and natural resources
(or may stem from the absence of certain resources) and may also be
labeled ecocide. Williams, for example, notes that environmental problems
have become “a source of conflict between nations or regions in relation to
scarcity of essential resources such as water.”144 In a similar vein, Polgreen
reports that “environmental degradation and the symptoms of a warming
planet are at the root of the Darfur crisis.”145 Likewise, Pellow and Brulle
suggest that increasing production of hazardous waste by the global North

VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 2 • 2008

750 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

has led to competition for global “pollution havens,” creating tensions
between nations and exacerbating the threat of conflict.146 And finally,
many regard the current war in Iraq as a war for oil—a position that is
frequently articulated with the chant “No Blood for Oil!” at antiwar
marches.147 Whether the United States undertook either the first or second
war in Iraq for oil-related reasons is subject to considerable debate. But
because of U.S. consumption of and infatuation with foreign oil, Friedman
eloquently argues, “[o]ur military is in a war on terrorism in Iraq and
Afghanistan with an enemy who is fueled by our gasoline purchases. So we
are financing both sides in the war on terror.”148 The particular target of
Friedman’s vitriol is a “fuel price protection program,” whereby General
Motors (GM) guaranteed a gasoline cap price of $1.99/gallon for one year,
with no limit on mileage, for residents of Florida and California who
purchased certain gas-guzzling vehicles.149 Friedman describes the actions
taken by GM (its “fuel price protection program”) “[l]ike a crack dealer
looking to keep his addicts on a tight leash”150 and concludes that “[t]he
more Hummers we have on the road in America, the more military
Humvees we will need in the Middle East.”151
Friedman’s logic, appealing as it may be, is a bit reductive.152 But the
notion that acts of war can occur because of a desire for natural resources
(or because of the lack of certain natural resources) and can bring about
destruction of ecosystems resonates with the socio-legal approach. None of
the activities or practices described herein are proscribed by criminal or
environmental legal regimes, but all cause “harm”—and arguably, greater
harm than that generated by acts or omissions covered by various legal
regimes.
In conclusion, MacNaughten and Urry claim that “[w]hat is viewed and
criticised as unnatural or environmentally damaging in one era or one
society is not necessarily viewed as such in another.”153 But the reverse is
also true: what is viewed as natural and undamaging in one era or one
society or one level of society is not necessarily viewed as such in another.
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The socio-legal approach tries to reveal instances in which this is the case.
In addition, there is often an assumption, as articulated by the legalprocedural approach, that what is criminalized—what is deemed a harm by
the criminal or legal regime—is somehow worse than those harms that are
not. The socio-legal approach challenges this ranking system. As Lynch
and Stretsky argue, we need to “redirect[] attention towards serious and
widespread environmental harms that, even more than ordinary crimes,
threaten human life and community”154—harms like Hurricane Katrina and
ecocide, discussed above, and animal abuse and cruelty, examined in the
next subsection.
3. Animal Abuse and Cruelty Under the Socio-Legal Approach to
Harm
On December 18, 2007, the Associated Press reported the following
story:
Deputies made nearly two dozen arrests after breaking up a
dogfighting operation, Sheriff Bob Buckley of Union Parish
[Louisiana] said. Sheriff Buckley said that at least six units from
his office and from the State Wildlife and Fisheries Office raided
the operation about 1 p.m. Sunday in woods on private property
about six miles southwest of Farmerville. “We took 12 vehicles,
guns, and 11 dogs were seized,” Sheriff Buckley said. Some of the
dogs were dead, he said. The dogs were taken to the Ouachita
Parish animal shelter.155
Because this story did not involve a high-profile professional athlete, it did
not receive the same publicity as Michael Vick’s dogfighting case. But it
likely became news because the activities described were particularly
abusive kinds of crimes—socially unacceptable, intentional or deliberate,
and unnecessary.156 While much criminalized animal abuse157 goes
undetected, arguably, an even greater amount of animal abuse is entirely
legal.158 As such, Beirne argues that “precisely because so many human
practices that are harmful to animals lie outside the scope of existing
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criminal law the latter is far too narrow a basis for the study of animal
abuse.”159 Similarly, Halsey asserts “criminology should not be constrained
by a strictly delimited field of analysis. Indeed, the vitality of the discipline
depends on its capacity to subject to critique events and processes which,
when viewed through one lens or another, are apt to attract the label ‘harm’
or a closely associated term.”160 Likewise, Agnew declares: “I do not
believe that criminologists should restrict their attention to criminal acts as
legally defined. We should also call attention to and examine non-criminal
acts which cause serious harm.”161
Agnew further fleshes out his rationale for investigating “non-criminal
acts which cause serious harm” by explaining that “[w]hile many of the acts
defined as abusive . . . are not criminal or even considered deviant by most
people, all such acts harm animals, serious moral objections have been
raised regarding these acts, and there is convincing evidence that such acts
result in much collective harm to people.”162 Indeed, there has been
extensive research finding that animal abuse and cruelty may serve as a
signifier of actual or potential interhuman conflict, especially domestic
violence163—partner abuse,164child physical abuse,165 child sexual abuse,166
and sibling abuse.167 Other research has looked retrospectively at adult
mass murderers and serial killers such as Jeffrey Dahmer, Dennis Rader,
Lee Boyd Malvo, and Columbine High School students Eric Harris and
Dylan Klebold and discovered that many had engaged in animal abuse and
cruelty earlier in life.168
Agnew’s perspective that noncriminal acts perpetrated on animals may
cause serious harm and thus merit criminological inquiry echoes the sociolegal approach. But his rationale is that such noncriminal animal-directed
abuse may lead to human-directed crime—or acts that fall under the legalprocedural approach. Furthermore, while the socio-legal approach includes
acts or omissions that may not constitute a violation of an existing form of
law but which result in, or possess the potential to result in, environmental
and human harm, many in the environmental justice movement regard the
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caring for animals as a luxury and animal welfare or animal rights issues as
secondary to those environmental matters affecting human health and
safety.169
The notion that environmental justice cannot encompass caring for
animals and must restrict itself to matters affecting human health and safety
is unfortunate. This is not to suggest that matters pertaining to animal abuse
and cruelty should take a more privileged or even an equal place with
respect to those environmental issues pertaining to human morbidity and
mortality. I simply wish to point out that if a form of noncriminal
environmental harm (animal abuse and cruelty) begets human-directed
crime such as domestic violence and murder,170 the likelihood that such
noncriminal environmental harm will precipitate the type of noncriminal
environmental harms that do concern environmental justice advocates
seems high. As Cartmill writes (albeit in a different context):
The line that our culture draws between people and beasts is a
moral as well as a conceptual boundary. More precisely, it is the
moral boundary: the borderline dividing persons from property, the
line that separates responsible agents with rights and duties from
more or less neutral stuff that can be made into soap and
lampshades. . . . Because the animal-human boundary is the
boundary of the moral universe, the stories that we tell about
human origins, even if they are true stories, are myths; and the
general point of those stories is explaining—and legitimating—
human control and domination of nature.171
By extension, elevating human-oriented environmentally criminal and
noncriminal harmful acts above animal-oriented environmentally criminal
and noncriminal acts, assuming such divisions are always clear,172 simply
serves to endorse “human control and domination over nature.” And human
control and domination over nature does not distinguish between those
activities and practices (both environmentally criminal and noncriminal)
that result primarily in harm to humans and those that result primarily in
harm to animals. Under this formulation, then, noncriminal acts which
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cause serious harm to animals—and which result in “much collective harm
to people”—should be considered examples of the socio-legal approach.
That being said, many argue that animal abuse and cruelty should be
investigated (and reduced or eliminated) in its own right, irrespective of the
impact on humans. The following section considers this attitude by
examining responses to “non-criminal acts which cause serious harm,” in
many instances, to animals—acts that are, in most instances, criminal under
the legal-procedural approach.
D. Responses to “Legal Harms” and “Crimes” in the Name of the
Environment: Ecodefense, Ecotage, and Monkeywrenching
Recognizing that a wide range of legal acts or omissions (i.e., practices
that may not constitute a violation of an existing form of law) on the part of
individuals and corporations result in, or possess the potential to result in,
environmental and human harm, some individuals, often working in celllike groups, have taken upon themselves to call attention to and/or stop
these activities. Such responses to “legal harms,” directed at farmers,
scientists, foresters, universities, housing developers, business owners,173
and “anyone who is destroying the environment for the sake of profit,”174
include a wide range of civil disobedience and direct action that are
frequently considered crimes or criminal under the legal-procedural
approach: firebombing, defacing, or slashing the tires of SUVs; vandalizing
business walls and windows with glass-etching cream and spray-paint;
damaging construction equipment used for housing developments or megastores; burning buildings (such as laboratories, horse corrals, and
unoccupied housing developments); tree-spiking (placing spikes in trees to
fend off loggers’ chainsaws); “net-ripping” (which, similar to tree-spiking,
involves dumping into the ocean tons of steel I-beams welded together to
form large spikes that destroy bottom-trawling nets); blocking access to
forest land that would otherwise be logged; disrupting hunts or otherwise
preventing recreational hunters from hunting; sabotaging research or
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facilities using animal-testing techniques; and liberating or removing
animals from fur farms or laboratories and industries that conduct animalbased research.175 Broadly speaking, all of these actions are undertaken for
the sake of environmental protection or in the name of the environment.
But the reasons and rationales for specific actions vary. And while the
actions are often intended to and can stand on their own, these reasons and
rationales for specific acts may become clear only through a communiqué
issued by the activists or an individual serving as a spokesperson for the
activists.176
To illustrate the range of goals and purposes for such responses to “legal
harms,” consider, for example, the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (Sea
Shepherd), an international marine wildlife conservation nonprofit
organization, which states that its
mission is to end the destruction of habitat and slaughter of
wildlife in the world’s oceans in order to conserve and protect
ecosystems and species. Sea Shepherd uses innovative directaction tactics to investigate, document, and take action when
necessary to expose and confront illegal activities on the high seas.
By safeguarding the biodiversity of our delicately-balanced ocean
ecosystems, Sea Shepherd works to ensure their survival for future
generations.177
Engaging in “coercive conservation,” Sea Shepherd uses its ships178 to ram
whaling, sealing, and fishing vessels on the seas179—actions intended to
stop these particular activities, but also to protest the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea180 and the ineffectiveness of the
International Whaling Commission to manage the world’s whale fisheries181
and to call attention to illegal fishing, violations of international
conservation law, and the overall extirpation of aquatic species.182
On land, the Earth Liberation Front (ELF)183 conducts its activities in
order to stop certain environmentally destructive practices from transpiring
or from continuing to transpire, to inflict economic damage on those
profiting from the exploitation of the natural environment as symbolic
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gestures to express outrage at the destruction of the planet, or to further
pedagogical purposes—to reveal, educate, and inform the public about
various individual and corporate practices that have adverse environmental
effects.184 Similarly, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), an anonymous,
leaderless, cell organization that often works in conjunction with ELF,185
“carries out direct action against animal abuse in the form of rescuing
animals and causing financial loss to animal exploiters, usually through the
damage and destruction of property.”186 ALF’s expressed guidelines are:
1. To liberate animals from places of abuse, i.e., laboratories,
factory farms, fur farms, etc., and place them in good homes where
they may live out their natural lives, free from suffering.
2. To inflict economic damage to those who profit from the misery
and exploitation of animals.
3. To reveal the horror and atrocities committed against animals
behind locked doors, by performing non-violent direct actions and
liberations.
4. To take all necessary precautions against harming any animal,
human and non-human.
5. To analyze the ramifications of all proposed actions, and never
apply generalizations when specific information is available.187
According to ALF, its “short-term aim is to save as many animals as
possible and directly disrupt the practice of animal abuse. [Its] long term
aim is to end all animal suffering by forcing animal abuse companies out of
business.”188
Just as the range of actions and reasons and rationales for such actions
vary, so, too, do the terms used to refer to them. “Ecodefense,” “ecotage”
(or
“eco-sabotage”),
“monkeywrenching,”
“ecoterrorism,”
and
“environmental terrorism” have all been used somewhat interchangeably as
descriptive terminology,189 depending on the perspective of the individual
or individuals discussing them. While ecodefense and monkeywrenching
(and, to a lesser extent, ecotage) are generally used by those supporting or

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Crime-Environment Relationships 757

participating in such activities,190 ecoterrorism and environmental terrorism
are more frequently employed by opponents of such methods and means.191
Using the word terrorism to refer to actions taken in the name of the Earth
and for the sake of environmental protection—something that is usually
done by government officials and corporate officers192—is unfortunate and
exceedingly and, arguably, intentionally misleading: it conflates actions
taken to thwart environmental destruction—actions that have never resulted
in human injury or death193—with those acts that use the environment as a
tool for indiscriminate violence or threatened violence to large numbers of
innocent civilians for the purpose of causing disruption, panic, harm and
death.194 As Mancuso-Smith delineates:
Although the immediate target is the environment, the
motivation behind an environmental terrorist attack mirrors that of
the geopolitical or ideological terrorist group. The threat of
tampering with a food or water supply or the release of nuclear
material or biological weapons is made to create fear and economic
hardship that would result in affected populations and to gain
support for the terrorist’s cause through their success. Unlike an
eco-terrorist . . . the environmental terrorist is not concerned with a
need to protect the environment or raise awareness of
environmental issues.
For the environmental terrorist, the
environment is targeted simply because of the human impact
resulting from its tampering or destruction. . . .
Eco-terrorism . . . is often confused with or mislabeled as
environmental terrorism.
The interchange of terms occurs
primarily because the natural environment features prominently in
each and the organizational structure of the participating groups is
often similar. . . . With environmental terrorism, the natural
resource itself is attacked because of the fear, panic, and impact on
the human population resulting from its destruction or tampering.
With eco-terrorism, the immediate focus is not on the natural
resource but rather on a physical or manmade structure such as a
dam, house or construction equipment, destroyed in order to deter
or cause economic harm to those entities whom the group
identified as enemies of the environment.195
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Accordingly, advocates and scholars of ecodefense, ecotage, and
monkeywrenching have argued against the application of the term
ecoterrorism196 when discussing actions intended to stop government or
corporate operations that damage the environment. Mancuso-Smith, for
example, proposes keeping the term environmental terrorism to refer to
“true” terrorism and replacing ecoterrorism with “eco-vandalism” or “ecosabotage” to indicate violent tactics by radical environmentalists.197 Some
have even tried to invert the word ecoterrorism to apply to “the terror and
destruction inflicted on the natural environment by industry.”198 But law
and policymakers have capitalized on fears of terrorism stirred by the
Oklahoma City bombings and September 11199 and have won the battle of
discourse: the word terrorism continues to be used broadly to refer to both
actions taken to curb environmental destruction and those that use the
environment as a tool to cause human harm and death, and the word
ecoterrorism now appears in various pieces of federal and state legislation
and proposed legislation.
Examples at the federal level include the Animal Enterprise Terrorism
Act,200 as well as the Environmental Terrorism Reduction Act.201 At the
state level, a number of states have passed ecoterrorism legislation based on
model legislation (the Animal and Ecological Terrorism Act) crafted by a
coalition formed between the U.S. Sportsmen’s Alliance and the American
Legislative Exchange Council.202 For instance, on April 14, 2006,
Governor Edward G. Rendell (D-PA) signed H.B. 213, referred to as an
“ecoterrorism bill,” which provides that an individual is guilty of
ecoterrorism if that person commits a number of “specified offenses against
property” with the intent to intimidate or coerce another individual lawfully
participating in an activity which involves animals, plants, or natural
resources, or the use of an animal, plant, or natural resource facility, or by
committing a specified offense against property with the intent to prevent a
person from lawfully participating in an activity involving animals, plants,
or natural resources, or using an animal, plant, or natural resource
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facility.203 The penalty for committing ecoterrorism in Pennsylvania is one
degree higher than it would be otherwise.204 Other states inspired by the
Animal and Ecological Terrorism Act include Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas,
Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and
Washington.205
In conclusion, measures taken to address or combat ecodefense/ecotage/
monkeywrenching—what this article has referred to as responses to “legal
harms” or crimes in the name of the environment—and what are mislabeled
with the moniker “terrorism,” represent an interesting dynamic in the
relationship between crime and the environment, as well as in the legalprocedural approach versus the socio-legal approach to environmental
justice. As a response to legal harms, some individuals commit actions that
constitute crimes in the sense of being unauthorized acts or omissions that
violate the law. Those who enact these responses to legal harms often
regard their activities as “necessary” to stop “the rape of the land.”206 For
them, statutes alone can never fully address the threats to the environment
or repair the destruction committed207 and a “focus on justice and redress
through the existing legal system may actually reinforce the very
institutional relations that create and maintain environmental injustice.”208
As Sea Shephard’s Watson writes:
In anthropocentric society, a harsh judgment is given to those that
destroy or seek to destroy the creations of humanity.
Monkeywrench a bulldozer and they will call you a vandal. Spike
a tree and they will call you a terrorist. Liberate a coyote from a
trap and they will call you a thief. Yet if a human destroys the
wonders of creation, the beauty of the natural world, then
anthropocentric society calls such people loggers, miners,
developers, engineers, and businessmen.209
The “real terrorism,” individuals such as Watson argue, is committed by
governments and industries that obliterate ecosystems and annihilate
species. Governments, in turn, respond to these responses to legal harms by
imposing harsher penalties210—sanctions that Gillespie might consider
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“organized state violence in the name of ‘law and order.’”211 Both sides are
locked in a race to the bottom where aggressive measures are met with more
aggressive measures. All the while, legal harms continue.
But harm is not the only arena in which crime and the environment
interact. The next section turns away from definitional questions of harm,
the presence or absence of legal regimes, and situations created by the
presence or absence of legal regimes. Instead, it explores causal and spatial
issues pertaining to the impact of the physical and natural environment on
crime, as well as the effect of the fear of crime in the environment and the
fear of crime in general on attitudes towards and interactions with physical
and natural environments.
E. Spatial and Situational Linkages Between Environment, Crime, and Fear
of Crime
1. Environmental Criminology, Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design, and the Impact of the Environment on Crime
In previous sections of this article, I used the phrase, “the relationship of
crime to the environment” mostly to mean the relationship between crime
and the natural environment. Thus, these sections contemplated harms,
however conceived, to air, water, soil, forests, and animals. This section
employs the word environment in a slightly different manner to mean
“surroundings” or “surrounding conditions” that influence or modify.
Although these surroundings or surrounding conditions include the natural
environment, they also include the physical or built environment, as well as
variable aspects of a location or site, such as its design, use, or the
management of the space.212 Environmental, then, becomes an adjective
synonymous with “situational” or “circumstantial” or “incidental.”
In most articulations, environmental criminology reflects this latter use of
the term environmental, referring to the study of spatial aspects of crime,
such as where, when, and how offenses take place;213 whether and how the
presence or absence of opportunity affects when and where criminal events
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occur;214 and how far offenders travel to offend.215 This concept of
environmental criminology is not entirely uniform216 or uncontested,217 but
in general, environmental criminology posits that offenders and potential
offenders consider situational features or cues to the perceived risk of being
caught and adapt their behavior based on the opportunities and risks
provided by each setting. Thus, for example, Michael, Hull, and Zahm’s
case study of auto burglary in Washington, D.C., parks examines the
relationship between urban park settings and auto burglary, considering
how “the commission of a crime is a process that follows a pattern, or
script”218 and indentifying a sequence of behaviors, discernible in the
commission of auto burglary. The behaviors are organized as seven acts:
(1) the select act of auto burglary (when offenders identify target
vehicles);219 (2) the approach act (when offenders approach the target for
further selecting and/or to begin gaining entry);220 (3) the perpetrate act
(techniques used to break into cars);221 (4) the escape act (when the
offender leaves the target and moves to a place where he can examine,
discard, or cache goods);222 (5) the examine act (when the offender
examines and sorts the stolen goods soon after perpetration and escape);223
(6) the discard act (when the offender casts off useless and problematic
proceeds from the theft);224 and (7) the cache act (when the offender stows
stolen items).225 They conclude that environmental factors influence
opportunities for auto burglary, such as how a park is patrolled, what “uses”
surround a park, and how a park is accessed (by paths or by parking lots)226
and that such criminal behavior is rational—a product of knowledge and
information allowing the offender or potential offender to weigh the costs
and benefits of offending at a particular place at a specific moment in
time—rather than random.227
As a corollary to environmental criminology, crime prevention through
environmental design (CPTED) focuses on developing strategies that
influence offenders’ and potential offenders’ calculus in deciding whether
to commit particular criminal acts. 228 CPTED strategies include: (1) “target
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hardening”—measures that increase the effort it takes to commit a crime,
such as the installation of bars on residential or business windows, shatterproof glass for windows in the case of auto burglary, fences, automobile
and home alarms, and electronic or tamper-proof locks; (2) improvements
to the physical structures of built space, such as limiting access to sites,
reducing the interconnections between building, and emphasizing the
distinction between public and private space—all of which control the flow
of individuals into and out of a space; and (3) steps to increase the risk of
detection and apprehension, such as security cameras and closed-circuit TV
monitoring, alarms, natural surveillance (additional lighting), and formal
surveillance (security guards or police patrol). 229
One particularly interesting and noteworthy issue within environmental
criminology and CPTED research concerns parks and outdoor spaces and
the role of vegetation—research that has produced some conflicting results.
For example, Michael, Hull, and Zahm remark that “parks have the
potential to be important activity nodes and therefore crime locations
because they serve as gathering places and pathways between daily
activities and provide recreation”230 and note that vegetation can provide
concealment during the “select act,” allowing offenders and potential
offenders to inconspicuously observe victims and potential victims, as well
as providing locations for offenders to discard useless and problematic
proceeds from the theft.231 As such, some in law enforcement argue for less
vegetation as a means of reducing criminal activity.232
But researchers at the Human-Environment Research Laboratory at the
University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign have reached somewhat different
conclusions, finding that everyday, unspectacular green spaces (such as
high-canopy trees, low shrubs, and grassy areas) can attract people outside,
positively affecting mood and attitudes, increasing and improving social
encounters among neighbors and subsequently fostering higher levels of
social cohesion in the community, decreasing domestic violence, and
reducing crime.233 Thus, while parks may present offenders and potential
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offenders with criminal opportunities arising out of routine activities and,
while vegetation may assist their routines,234 the loss of green spaces,
plantings, and other vegetation can result in a reduction in site quality and
other negative, crime-related consequences,235 thereby complicating the
impact of the environment (in both senses: surrounding conditions and
natural) on crime.
2. The Impact of the Fear of Crime in and on the Environment
As noted in the previous subsection, parks and other outdoor spaces
present offenders and potential offenders with criminal opportunities.236
While most of the criminal events perpetrated in parks occur in urban
places, those that occur in national and state parks receive significant
publicity,237 leading many to fear nature and avoid spending time in such
spaces.238 According to Richard Louv, author of Last Child in the Woods:
Saving Our Children from Nature-Deficit Disorder:
Stranger danger isn’t the only reason families draw the boundaries
of children’s life tighter. Children and adults are even beginning to
see nature as our natural enemy—a bogeyman, a stand-in for other,
less identifiable reasons for fear . . . .
A few years ago, a motel handyman confessed to the FBI that
he killed three Yosemite sightseers just outside the national park,
and later decapitated a naturalist in the park. Other recent stories
may have jarred Americans’ confidence in the outdoors. In
Washington’s Olympic National Park in 1998, there were eightytwo break-ins, forty-seven cases of vandalism, sixty-four incidents
involving drug and alcohol abuse, one sexual assault, and one
aggravated assault with a weapon. The park’s rangers now carry
semi-automatic weapons. Also in 1998, in the Great Smoky
Mountains, a deranged landscaper who enjoyed singing gospel
music shot and killed National Park Service ranger Joe Kolodski.
Elsewhere, two park rangers were shot, one fatally, in Oregon’s
Oswald West State Park.
Movies tap into this fear. The 1930s Wolfman seems mild
compared with the terror exploited in the lengthening string of
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summer-camp slasher films or The Blair Witch Project, a horror
movie set in the forest.239
Louv argues that this “nature fear”240—this fear of the environment and fear
of crime in the environment—has proven corrosive. By associating nature
with crime and fear, parents, and subsequently their children, have little
direct contact with the outdoors.241 Consequently, not only are they unable
to receive the many benefits of such experiences,242 but they fail to form
bonds with outdoor green spaces and places. The end result may be that
such individuals fail to act in environmentally benevolent or beneficent
ways, causing harms under either the legal-procedural approach, the sociolegal approach, or both. These individuals, overwhelmed by fear and
suffering from “nature deficit disorder,” may find themselves unable to
forge relationships with others and develop a sense of community. Louv
warns that:
as more parents keep their children inside the house or under rigid
control, youngsters will be deprived of chances to become selfconfident and discerning, to interact with neighbors, or to learn
how to build real community—which is one defense against
sociopaths . . . .
Parents may now buy a cheerfully colored, three-ounce bracelet
called the global positioning system (GPS) personal locator, and
lock it on their child’s wrist. If the water-resistant bracelet is cut or
forcefully removed, its continuous signal activates an alarm and
notifies the manufacturer’s emergency operators. At least at first
glance, resistance to global personal tracking seems not only futile
but also selfish—because we love our children and want to protect
them. But guaranteed safety, or the illusion of it, can only be
bought at a dangerous price. Imagine future generations of
children who have been raised to accept the inevitability of being
electronically tracked every day, every second, in every room of
their lives, in the un-brave new world. Such technology may work
in the short run, but it may also create a false sense of security and
serve as a poor substitute for the proven antidotes to crime: an
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active community, more human eyes on the streets, and selfconfident children.243
In addition to fear of crime in the environment, individuals may possess a
more generalized fear of crime.244 The fear of crime leads to the “flight
from blight” and the unlimited outward expansion of cities.245 Those living
in the suburbs tend to drive more frequently (contributing to poor air
quality—a type of legal harm),246 and often drive SUVs—legal harms on
wheels (because of their poor fuel efficiency) that prey on individuals’ fear
of violence and crime.247 An unfortunate, albeit ironic, effect of this fearinduced fleeing to the edges of cities is that crime from urban areas may
follow,
spill[ing] into the sea of public land that surrounds many of the
fastest-growing cities in the Western United States. . . . [A]s cities
like Reno; Denver; Phoenix; Tucson; Albuquerque; and Boise,
Idaho; and smaller communities like Bend, Oregon, and Moab,
Utah, grow at rates far beyond the national average, they bump
against the public land that surround them, carrying urban crimes
to open space.248
A subsequent effect, then, may be the very fear described by Louv above—
the creation of a cycle between fear of crime and environmental harm.249

III. CONCLUSION
In Power, Justice, and the Environment: A Critical Appraisal of the
Environmental Justice Movement, Pellow and Brulle, siding with both
Faber250 and Mutz, Bryner, and Kenney,251 argue that the environmental
justice movement has not extended its reach broadly enough to combat both
environmental degradation and social inequalities.252 Disagreeing with
Foreman’s contention that environmental justice advocates and scholars
have spread the movement too thin by considering and engaging with issues
only tangentially related to environmental and social justice concerns,253
Pellow and Brulle suggest a number of directions for researchers of

VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 2 • 2008

766 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

environmental justice, including: (1) continued documentation of the range
of problems facing communities of color coupled with “a stronger move
toward a solution orientation”;254 (2) stronger social class analyses of
environmental injustices;255 (3) efforts to forge connections between
environmental justice research and other disciplines “in order to build the
field and produce advances in theory. . . . [and] to engage in a conversation
across disciplines that redefines the way those disciplines approach
questions concerning not only the environment but also race/ethnicity, class,
gender, and nation”;256 and (4) exploration of innovative methodological
approaches to create new knowledge.257
Pellow and Brulle’s third recommendation—their appeal for conversation
and work across disciplines—is echoed by criminologists such as White,
who acknowledges “that investigation of environmental harm requires
analysis which is wide-ranging and multi-disciplinary, and which is
sensitive to the inter-connectedness of social and ecological phenomena.”258
Likewise, South maintains that:
Criminology must recognize the finite nature of the earth’s
resources and how this fits with global and socio-economic trends
which have profound implications for the social sciences. A
criminology relevant to the next century should have the
intellectual breadth and constitutional space to be able to embrace
environmental, human and animal rights issues as related
projects….
….
Green issues open up a wide range of possibilities for
interdisciplinary work, both within the social sciences and with
disciplines in the natural sciences offering the potential for
collaboration between criminologists and economists, geographers,
biologists, health specialists, human rights workers, lawyers and
others.259
This article has attempted to respond to the calls from both realms and to
open the lines of communication between researchers in these diverse areas
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by highlighting some of the myriad relationships between crime and the
environment. While previous efforts have articulated environmental justice
concerns with issues of crime,260 more work is needed in this area. As
Faber and McCarthy advise in Green of Another Color: Building Effective
Partnerships between Foundations and the Environmental Justice
Movement—a report by the Philanthropy and Environmental Justice
Research Project at Northeastern University:
Environmental grantmakers and other foundations can play an
instrumental role in facilitating the transformation of green politics
in America by funding those organizations championing the sorts
of fundamental social and institutional changes needed to address
the ecological crisis. However, if foundations and the
environmental movement continue to conceive of the ecological
crisis as a collection of unrelated problems, and if the reigning
paradigm is defined in neo-liberalist terms, then it is possible that
some combination of regulations, incentives, and technical
innovations can keep pollution and resource destruction at
“tolerable” levels for many people of higher socio-economic
status. However, poorer working class communities and people of
color which lack the political-economic resources to defend
themselves will continue to suffer the worst abuses. If, however,
the interdependency of issues is emphasized, as in the
environmental justice movement, so that environmental
devastation, ecological racism, poverty, crime, and social despair
are all seen as aspects of a multi-dimensional web rooted in a
larger structural crisis, then a transformative ecology movement
can be invented. This is the aim of environmental justice activism,
and foundations need to better assist the movement in achieving
this goal.261
Thus, future explorations of the relationships between crime and the
environment should continue to reveal their intricate networks.
Furthermore, such investigations should show that crime and the
environment are sufficiently intertwined as to bolster environmental justice
as it confronts increasing levels of social inequality. Research along these
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lines may also contribute to the foundation of environmental justice.
Indeed, it must. For as Van Jones, board president and co-founder of the
Ella Baker Center for Human Rights in Oakland, California, pleads, “If we
want to have a broad-based environmental movement, we need more entry
points.”262
By allowing more individuals to view their work as
environmental justice, thereby providing for new avenues of cooperation
and collaboration, crime-environment relationships can do just that.
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SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1997); cf. James
Inciardi et al., Drug Control and the Courts, at 23–24 (Drugs, Health, and Social Policy
Series vol. 3, 1996).
For various perspectives on some of the less harsh and more constructive
environment-related interactions that current prisoners have had—involvement that has
proven beneficial to both the environment and to the prisoners—see, for example, GREG
BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING
JUSTICE 83 (2005) (discussing community court sanctions in which supervised offender
work crews perform yard work for residents over age sixty and on fixed incomes (citing
Sam Oliver, Yard Work Program Sows the Seeds of Good Neighborhoods, COMMUNITY
CT. REP. (Multnomah County Community Court Project, Portland, Or.), July 2001, at 1);
Avi Brisman, Fair Fare?: Food as Contested Terrain in U.S. Prisons and Jails, 15 GEO.
J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2008) (describing the insect “farming” program
at the Seminole County Correctional Facility in Florida, where inmates raise “beneficial
bugs” that reduce the need for chemical pesticides and fight invasive pets, as well as
programs in correctional facilities in Connecticut, Georgia, and Indiana where inmates
grind, mix, monitor and turn compost, reduce organic loading (nitrogen and BOD—
biochemical (biological) oxygen demand), and produce better landscaping through
compost application (citing Nancy Allen, Composting Food Scraps at Georgia Prison,
BIOCYCLE, Apr. 1994, at 90, 90; Waste Wood, Food Rejects Make Great Combo at
County/State Prison Site, BIOCYCLE, July 2001, at 19, 19; Dave Block, Composting
Prison Food Residuals, BIOCYCLE, Aug. 1997, at 37, 37–39; Chuck Woods, Seminole
County Inmates Raise “Beneficial Bugs” for UF and USDA Researchers, UNIV. FLA.
NEWS, Nov. 8, 2004, http://news.ufl.edu/2004/11/08/prison-bigs/; Chuck Woods, Bailed
Out by BUGS, AM. VEGETABLE GROWER, Dec. 2005, available at http://www.
allbusiness.com/agriculture-forestry/crop-production-vegetable/978091-1 .html).
11
Mark Halsey & Rob White, Crime, Ecophilosophy and Environmental Harm, 2
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 345, 345 (1998).
12
Id. at 346.
13
Id. at 345–46. See generally Rob White, Environmental Criminology and Sydney
Water, 10 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 214, 214 (1998) [hereinafter White, Sydney
Water] (“[D]ifferent approaches and perspectives associated with the study of
environmental harm . . . range from analyses which primarily focus on the law, as either a
means of regulation or facilitation of environmental harm, through to those which
challenge prevailing conceptions and definitions of ‘harm,’ often through reference to
some notion of ecological rights.” (citation omitted)).
14
Halsey & White, supra note 11, at 346.
15
Note that by February 2008, all American medical schools will have ended the
practice of operating on dogs to examine their beating hearts. See Nicholas Bakalar,
Killing Dogs In Training Of Doctors Is To End, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2008, at D5.
16
Lynch & Stretsky, supra note 5, at 218, 229. See generally Benton, supra note 5, at
166 (describing the “consequences of acts of commission or omission on the part of large
private organizations—transport disasters, chemical plant explosions, the break-up of oil
tankers and the like.”).
17
Lynch & Stretsky, supra note 5, at 229.
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Id. at 227; cf. HALSEY, DELEUZE, supra note 5, at 42–56 (acknowledging the
difference between environmental damage or environmental harm and environmental
crime, and providing a good summary of Lynch and Stretsky’s corporate perspective and
environmental justice view, but critiquing their failure to clarify their position regarding
the role of the state and its relationship to strategies of environmental renewal, their
alignment with Marxist notions of power, their dialectical view of society, and their
deployment of the phrase “environmental justice”); Halsey, Green Criminology, supra
note 4, at 833, 836, 843–45.
Lane, to offer another vantage point, critiques “traditional” environmental law on the
grounds that
[e]nvironmental law (national and international) predominantly utilizes a
modernist, utilitarian approach to nature that is anthropocentric (i.e. human
centered). These laws have been based upon specific ‘readings’ of nature;
predominantly through the disciplines of the ‘natural’ sciences and economics.
Within this approach, nature is seen to be of instrumental value for humans;
nature has few intrinsic rights (although some areas of the law, such as the
preservation of endangered species, move beyond utilitarianism).
Lane, supra note 5, at 244.
Along the lines of both Halsey and White and Lynch and Stretsky, Lane declares:
As coalitions of actors (those transient alliances involving academics, new age
travelers, lawyers, ecofeminists, ecologists, etc.) combine their forces, they are
starting to resist these modernist, utilitarian approaches to nature.
‘Postmodernist’ environmental-movement alliances are starting to act as a
mirror to the dominant anthropocentric approach to nature. They are engaged
in a process of questioning people’s relationships with/in nature and
attempting to establish new environmental ethics. If these alliances are to
prevail, they will need to challenge the current valuing of nature; if they
succeed, then criminology as we know it will no longer suffice. We may see
the law shift from anthropocentrism (human centred) to becoming more
ecocentric (nature) centred, where nature is seen to have value in its won right
and ‘rights.’ Not only would this criminalize previously acceptable behaviour,
but also liberate behaviour that is current seen as criminal.
Id. at 244–45.
But Lane diverges somewhat from the formulations of Halsey and White and Lynch
and Stretsky:
To aim to criminalize all anti-environment activity implies an acceptance of a
single concept of nature (and what is best for nature), as well as an acceptance
of resort to the processes of criminal law as the correct mechanism for dealing
with the problems. Perhaps an environmentally sensitive criminology can
learn from those coalitions of actors concerned about environmental
degradation who are recognizing the strengths of a diffused approach, utilizing
both the dominant ideas about nature (i.e. science and economics) as well as
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promoting new ideas (such as deep ecology). Actors within these new
alliances are aware of the need both to recognize the possibilities of working
inside the current legal structures as well as challenging or rejecting them.
Id. at 245–46.
For additional points of view on the boundaries of crime and environmental crime,
see, for example, Herman Schwendinger & Julia Schwendinger, Defenders of Order or
Guardians of Human Rights?, in CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 113, 113–46 (Ian Taylor, Paul
Walton, & Jock Young eds., 1975) (discussing debates surrounding “legal definitions of
crime” and arguing that “[i]f the terms imperialism, racism, sexism and poverty are
abbreviated signs for theories of social relationships or social systems which cause the
systematic abrogation of basic rights, then imperialism, racism, sexism and poverty can
be called crimes”); South, supra note 8, at 213–14, 227 n.3 (“The earth and its resources
are being wasted and over-exploited by processes in which human beings are
commodities in chains of production and distribution, and profit is put before sense or
sensibility. In these processes, multiple and numerous crimes, violations, deviations and
irregularities are perpetrated against the environment, yet go largely unchecked. . . . In
this essay I usually refer to crimes and violations defined as such by law and regulatory
bodies. However, in the tradition of work on ‘crimes of the powerful,’ I also use the
terms where they may not legally apply.”); White, Imagination, supra note 5, at 485
(distinguishing between limited and broad definitions of environmental crime);
Christopher Williams, An Environmental Victimology, SOC. JUST., Winter 1996, at 16,
19–20 (criticizing existing formulations of “environmental law” on the grounds that
“[e]nvironmental law usually embodies the principle that the outcome of an act must
have been ‘reasonably foreseeable’ for it to constitute an offense. So far, however, most
environmental law relates to damage to the physical world, not human injury.”). See
NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES 263–64 (1999)
(“Despite the widening gulf between rich and poor consistently reported by the UN and
despite the much-discussed disappearance of the middle class in the West, the attack on
jobs and income levels is probably not the most serious corporate offense we face as
global citizens: it is, in theory, not irreversible. Far worse, in the long term, are the
crimes committed by corporations against the natural environment, the food supply and
indigenous peoples and cultures.”); Lynch, supra note 5, at 166 (discussing
“environmental destruction as an outcome of the structure of modern, industrialized
capitalist production and consumption patterns that are protected by corporate ideology,
governmental consumption, and lax regulation. . . . [E]nvironmental crises are . . .
‘corporate crimes’ that violate humanistic sensibilities.” (citations omitted)).
19
In addition, a broader consideration of harm via the socio-legal approach or
environmental justice perspective has helped increase rights, improve protections, and
reduce injury and degradation.
20
See infra Part II.E.
21
See infra Part II.E.
22
See infra Part II.E.
23
FRANCIS T. CULLEN & ROBERT AGNEW, CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: PAST TO
PRESENT 427 (3d ed. 2006).
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This is not to suggest that the organization of linkages between crime and the
environment around the broad themes of harm and criminal patterns or spatial aspects of
crime is the only possible grouping available. White, for example, arranges his
discussion of drinking water in Sydney, Australia, under the categories “ownership and
control,” “consumption and maintenance issues,” and “the regulatory environment.”
White, Sydney Water, supra note 13, at 215.
25
For sake of clarity, this article will hereinafter refer to the “legal-procedural approach”
or “corporate perspective” as simply the “legal-procedural approach.”
26
Helena du Rées, Can Criminal Law Protect the Environment?, 2 J. SCANDINAVIAN
STUD. 109, 110 (2001). Although du Rées’s article is based on research conducted in
Sweden, her discussion of employing criminal sanctions to prevent environmental
damage and disaster is relevant to the United States.
Note that according to one commentator, such activities and practices “were accepted
as regulatory violations” until recently. Timothy S. Carter, The Failure of Environmental
Regulation in New York, 26 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 27, 27 (1997). Today, the public
is “more likely to view such offenses as resembling traditional crimes.” Id.
Nevertheless, “[t]he paradox of environmental crime, as something less than real crime,
is a product of social construction. This particular perception is an artifact created by the
economic, political and social forces affecting the regulators, and the manifestation of
this attitude among environmental enforcement agents is very real.” Id. at 28.
27
Id. at 111.
28
Id. at 111–12.
29
South, supra note 8, at 220; see also Anna Alvazzi del Frate & Jennifer Norberry,
Rounding Up: Themes and Issues, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME, SANCTIONING
STRATEGIES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, at 1, 6 (Anna Alvazzi del Frate &
Jennifer Norberry eds., U.N. Interregional Crime & Justice Research Inst., Publication
No. 50, 1993). Note that according to South, “[s]ince the mid-1970s, most western
countries have toughened up anti-dumping and pollution laws.” South, supra note 8, at
218.
30
In addition to federal environmental law, states and municipalities have a wide range
of environmental laws and a wide range of sanctions for violations of them. See, e.g.,
Malcolm Gay, The Catfish Are Biting (and It Hurts), N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2007, at A8
(describing how “noodling” or hand fishing is illegal in Missouri, but legal in thirteen
states in the Midwest and Southeast, including Kansas, which just allowed its first
noodling season); infra notes 57–63 and accompanying text; see also Alvazzi del Frate &
Norberry, supra note 29, at 2 (noting that “environmental protection operates at quite
different levels—national, state or provincial, and local”).
On a broader scale, international environmental law attempts to deal with a wide range
of cross-boundary or transnational issues affecting the global environment and also
contains a wide range of sanctions for violations of international environmental law
provisions. See, e.g., id. at 18–19 (discussing both multilateral conventions and protocols
and bilateral agreements); Luan Low & David Hodgkinson, Compensation for Wartime
Environmental Damage: Challenges to International Law After the Gulf War, 35 VA. J.
INT’L L. 405, 420–21 n.134, 461–64, 483 (1995) (discussing transboundary
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environmental harm and various conventions, protocols, and cases attempting to affect or
provide redress for such harm).
Finally, other countries possess a broad array of environmental laws that may or may
not have U.S. counterparts and which, in some instances, may run counter to U.S. federal
and/or state law. For recent examples, see Regan Morris, Ban on Kangaroo Hides
Puzzles Australians Here, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2007, at A11, (discussing how the
California Supreme Court has effectively banned the sale of kangaroo leather soccer
shoes, whereas in Australia, kangaroo culls occur annually to keep the population in
check); see also Ellen Barry, A Taste of Monkey, and Maybe of Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 2007, at A17 (discussing different perspectives on “bushmeat” in the United States
and Liberia); Tom Hays, Monkey Meat at Center of NYC Court Case, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 25, 2007, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/11/25/
monkey_meat_at_center_of_nyc_court_case/. To keep matters manageable, this article
focuses on U.S. federal and state law. For an in-depth examination of environmental
crime and the legal frameworks for environmental protection in Australia, Argentina,
Brazil, Czechoslovakia, China, India, Nigeria, and Tunisia, see Alvazzi del Frate &
Norberry, supra note 29.
31
Note that some countries possess constitutional guarantees of environmental
protection. For a discussion of the constitutions of Brazil, China, and India, see Alvazzi
del Frate & Norberry, supra note 29, at 6–7. The United States Constitution does not
provide such a guarantee. A proposed amendment to guarantee U.S. citizens the right to
an environment free of pollution failed in 1971.
32
According to two commentators who have conducted a worldwide examination of
sanctioning strategies, imprisonment for violations of environmental protection laws
occurs far less frequently than monetary penalties. Alvazzi del Frate & Norberry, supra
note 29, at 14.
33
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a), (b) (2006). For an accessible
discussion of some of the provisions of TSCA, see Lynn R. Goldman, Toxic Chemicals
and Pesticides, in STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 403 (John C. Dernbach ed.,
2002).
34
Section 113 of the CAA (42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2006)) contains criminal penalties;
section 205 of the CAA (42 U.S.C. § 7524(a) (2006)) provides for civil penalties. For an
accessible discussion of some of the issues regarding air pollution, as well as some of the
provisions of the CAA, see David M. Driesen, Air Pollution, in STUMBLING TOWARD
SUSTAINABILITY supra note 33, at 257.
35
Section 309 of the CWA (33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (c))contains criminal penalties; section
404 of the CWA (33 U.S.C. § 1344 (s)(4)) provides for civil penalties. For an accessible
discussion of some of the issues regarding water and water pollution, as well as some of
the provisions under the CWA, see Robert W. Adler, Fresh Water, in STUMBLING
TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 33, at 197.
Recently, the U.S. federal government levied the largest civil penalty for a pollution
violation under the CWA: on January 17, 2008, the coal producer, Massey Energy
Company, agreed to a $30 million settlement ($20 million in civil penalties and $10
million investment in pollution control improvements at its forty-four mines in Kentucky,
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Virgina, and West Virginia). See Ian Urbina, U.S. Fines Mine Owner $20 Million For
Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2008, at A14.
36
Sections 3008(d) and (g) of RCRA (42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), (g) (2006)) contain criminal
penalties. For a brief overview of RCRA, see Frank Scarpitti & Alan A. Block,
America’s Toxic Waste Racket: Dimensions of the Environmental Crisis, in ORGANIZED
CRIME IN AMERICA: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 115, 118–19 (Timothy S. Bynum
ed., 1987) [hereinafter Scarpitti & Block, Racket]. For a more in-depth discussion of
RCRA’s provisions as they relate to hazardous waste, municipal solid waste, and
radioactive waste, see Marian Chertow, Municipal Solid Waste, in STUMBLING TOWARD
SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 33, at 467; Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields Redevelopment, in
STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 33, at 457; Joel A. Mintz, Hazardous
Waste and Superfund, in STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 33, at 443;
James D. Werner, Radioactive Waste, in STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra
note 33, at 479.
37
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a), (b) (2006). For a critical assessment of
the ESA, see A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity and Endangered Species, in STUMBLING
TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 33, at 311.
38
Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1733 (2006).
39
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(a), (b) (2006).
40
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11045 (2006).
For an accessible discussion of some of the provisions of EPCRA, see Frances Irwin &
Carl Bruch, Public Access to Information, Participation, and Justice, in STUMBLING
TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 33, at 511–540.
41
Noise Control Act, 44 U.S.C. § 4910(a)(1), (2) (2006). Note that many cities and
towns have noise ordinances and laws that cover a range of activities—from lawn
mowers, leaf blowers, and weed whackers to pool parties to dog whining and barking.
For a recent discussion, see Jennifer V. Hughes, Who (Doesn’t) Let the Dogs Bark, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2007, at 14NJ; Paul Vitello, That Racket? It’s the Sound of Suburbia,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2007, at 14NJ. See generally Rebecca Cathcart, Enemy Aircraft
Sighted and, Above All Else, Heard, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2007, at A9. Ironically, in the
1999 Census Bureau housing survey, noise was listed as the top neighborhood complaint
and reason to make people consider moving, ahead of crime, which ranked second. See
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1999,
NEIGHBORHOOD—OCCUPIED
UNITS,
tbl.2-8
(2005),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/ housing/ahs/ahs99/tab28.html; see also Vitello,
supra. The most recent of the Census Bureau’s biannual surveys of housing conditions in
the United States (2005) produced similar results. See OFFICE OF POLICY, DEV. &
RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T
OF COMMERCE, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE U.S.: 2005, at 62 tbl.2-8 (2006),
available at http://www.census.gov/ prod/2006pubs/h150-05.pdf. For a discussion of
noise pollution in Asian countries, see, for example, Alvazzi del Frate & Norberry, supra
note 29, at 4.
42
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666 (2006).
43
Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
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44

The EPA administers the Clean Air Act (CAA); the Clean Water Act (CWA); the
Comprehensive Environmental Response; Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA);
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA); the Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA); the Oil Pollution Act (OPA); the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA); the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA); the
Noise Control Act (NCA); and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). The Department
of the Interior has primary responsibility for the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), and the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act (SMCRA); the Department of Labor has primary responsibility for
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).
45
Note that Section 202(a)(5) of the Pollution Prosecution Act required the EPA to
employ two hundred criminal investigators by October 1, 1995, but the number of
criminal investigators has actually dropped to 174. See Rita Beamish, Number of
Environmental Cops Decreasing, ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP) NEWSWIRE, July 26, 2007,
available at http://asia.news.yahoo.com/070726/ap/d8qk4sfg0.html. For a report on how
the number of environmental criminal cases filed by the United States Department of
Justice (DOJ) is down, along with drops in civil penalties, criminal fines, and criminal
investigations, see Press Release, Environmental Integrity Project, Efforts Under Bush
Administration’s EPA Drop on Four Out of Five Key Points (May 23, 2007), available at
http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/pubs/052307%20EIP%20EPA%20enforcement%
20data%20news%20release%20FINAL3.pdf; ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, PAYING LESS
TO POLLUTE: ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
(2007), available at http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/pubs/
Paying%20Less% 20to%20Pollute.pdf.
Note also that the State of California deputizes bounty hunters to help enforce its
environmental laws. Private lawyers receive a quarter of any penalty (the rest goes to the
state) plus legal fees. The system is somewhat controversial. While some laud the
efforts of these “citizen enforcers,” who are able to extract quick settlements, others
regard it as “legalized extortion” and claim that the public gains little from the litigations
(such as notices and warnings about the emission of carcinogens from dried paint,
furniture, parking lots, wiring, etc.). See Adam Liptak, Environmental Bounty Hunters,
on Trail of Cash, Are in California Official’s Sights, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2007, at A14.
46
See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. § 1268
(2006).
47
See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136l
(2006); Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 33 U.S.C. § 2716(a) (2006).
48
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601–9675 (2006).
49
Note that CERCLA regulates unintentional emissions and releases of hazardous
substances, rather than just planned or permitted emissions. Unlike RCRA, which
pertains to the prospective handling and management of hazardous waste and solid waste
stream, CERCLA is retrospective, regulating the remediation of spills or releases of
hazardous substances. The distinction between “waste” and “substance” is key—
CERCLA deals with hazardous substances, which may not be wastes per se. Thus,
CERCLA includes not only the RCRA list of hazardous wastes but also hazardous
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chemicals regulated by the CWA, the 189 hazardous air pollutants under the CAA, and
the substances regulated under TSCA.
50
Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 622, 675, 676 (2006); see also Piers
Beirne, For a Nonspeciest Criminology: Animal Abuse as an Object of Study, 37
CRIMINOLOGY 117, 126 (1999) [hereinafter Beirne, Nonspeciest].
51
Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §1907(c) (2006); see also Patti Bednarik, What the
General Practitioner Needs To Know About Pennsylvania Animal Law, 77 PA. B. ASS’N.
Q. 88, 92 (2006) (noting that, unlike livestock, poultry is not covered under the Humane
Methods of Slaughter Act); Beirne, Nonspeciest, supra note 50, at 126.
52
Horse Protection Act (HPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1821 (2006); see also Beirne, Nonspeciest,
supra note 50, at 126.
53
Wild Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006); see also Beirne, Nonspeciest,
supra note 50, at 126. See No Wrongdoing In Donkey Shootings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2007, at A30 (reporting that two Texas state park officials had been cleared of
wrongdoing in the shooting deaths of wild donkeys and feral burros).
54
Food Security Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3801–3862 (2006); see also Beirne, Nonspeciest,
supra note 50, at 126.
55
Health Research Extension Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-158, 99 Stat. 820;
see also Beirne, Nonspeciest, supra note 50, at 126.
56
See also Beirne, Nonspeciest, supra note 50, at 126.
57
For a discussion of the Sportsmanship in Hunting Act of 2005, H.R. 1688, 109th
Cong. (2005), which would prohibit the interstate transport of exotic mammals for the
use of “canned hunts,” see, for example, Bednarik, supra note 51, at 91; Christopher
Shays, Animal Welfare: Its Place in Legislation, 12 ANIMAL L. 1, 2 (2005). For a
discussion of H.R. 503, 109th Cong. (as passed by House, Sept. 7, 2006), which would
amend the Horse Protection Act to ban horse slaughter for human consumption in the
United States as well as the transport and sale of horses across U.S. borders for the
purpose of slaughter for human consumption, see, for example, Catrin Einhorn, Death
Across the Border Awaits Horses Spared It in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008, at
A10; The Humane Society of the United States, End Horse Slaughter Permanently (Oct.
3, 2007), http://www.hsus.org/legislation_laws/citizen_lobbyist_center/help_end_horse_
slaughter.html.
In a different vein, a Nevada woman was recently indicted on charges of theft of
government property and willingly damaging government property for removing three
large one hundred-year-old trees from environmentally sensitive federal land near Lake
Tahoe in order “to improve her view.” She faces up to ten years in prison and a $250,000
fine for each count if she is convicted. Woman May See Bars Instead of View, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2008, at A13.
58
Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2156 (2006); see also Bednarik, supra note
51, at 90; Beirne, Nonspeciest, supra note 50, at 126; Mariann Sullivan, The Animal
Welfare Act—What’s That?, N.Y. ST. B. J., July–Aug. 2007, at 17, 17–23.
Note that the Improved Standards for Laboratory Animals Act of 1985 (ISLAA), 7
U.S.C. §§ 2131, 2158–2159 (2006), further amended the AWA. See, e.g., Shigehiko Ito,
Beyond Standing: A Search for a New Solution in Animal Welfare, 46 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 377, 384 (2006); Katharine M. Swanson, Carte Blanche for Cruelty: The Non-
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Enforcement of the Animal Welfare Act, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 937, 941 (2002); see
also Beirne, Nonspeciest, supra note 50, at 126. Note also that the Pet Animal Welfare
Statute (PAWS), introduced as H.R. Res. 2669, 109th Cong. (2005), would amend the
Animal Welfare Act to strengthen the ability of the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate
the pet industry. See, e.g., Bednarik, supra, at 90; Sullivan, supra, at 22.
59
Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a), (b); see also United States v. Vick, No.
3:07CR274, at 1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007), available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/
football/nfl/vick-summary-of-facts-070824.pdf (summary of facts).
60
See United States v. Vick, No. 3:07CR274, at 1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/vick-summary-of-facts-070824.pdf
(summary of facts).
61
See id. (plea agreement).
62
See Juliet Macur, Vick Receives 23 Months and a Lecture, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007,
at. D1. For a report on how the sentences received by Vick’s co-defendants exceeded the
government’s recommendations, see Michael S. Schmidt, Message Sent in Sentencing of
Two Vick Co-Defendants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2007, at B12.
63
See, e.g., Bednarik, supra note 51, at 89–90 (discussing illegal dog fighting in
Pennsylvania as well as puppy mills, the breeding and training of fighting dogs, and
“Internet hunting”); Robert D. Roth, A Dog’s Best Friend: California’s New Animal
Cruelty Protections, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 230 (2007) (discussing legislation regarding
dog tethering in California).
According to Beirne, while state anticruelty statutes “vary somewhat in how they
define crucial terms like ‘animal’ and ‘cruelty,’ they generally recognize that animals
ought to be protected from cruelty, abandonment, and poisoning and that they must be
provided with necessary sustenance, including food, water, and shelter.” Beirne,
Nonspeciest, supra note 50, at 126 (citation omitted). But, Beirne adds,
a majority of state anticruelty statutes define the acts of commission and
omission that constitute cruelty to animals as misdemeanors rather than
felonies. Among the 16 states that define the offense as a felony, penalties for
violations vary considerably. For example, while the maximum fine for
cruelty to animals is $5,000 in Alaska and Pennsylvania and $10,000 in
Wisconsin, it is only $50 in Missouri. Prison sentences, too, span a wide
range: from nothing at all in Ohio and Virginia, to a maximum of six months
in Alabama and California, three years in Maine, and five years in Oklahoma.
Id. at 126 n.6. Similarly, Bednarik points out that Pennsylvania exempts “‘activity
undertaken in normal agricultural operation’ from its animal cruelty statute.” Bednarik,
supra note 51, at 91 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5511(c)(3) (2004)). This is true in
other states. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(a)(5), (9) (Vernon 2007).
Note that sometimes cases involving animal cruelty can pit defenders of one animal
species against another. In a highly publicized case in Texas in 2007, a bird enthusiast
was tried on charges of animal cruelty for shooting and killing a cat that he claimed was
stalking endangered shorebirds. Bird-watchers helped fund his defense, while catfanciers condemned him as a “murderous fascist” and “diabolical monster.” See Kate
Murphy, Judge Declares a Mistrial in Texas Cat Killing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
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2007, at A11; Kate Murphy, Trial Begins for Bird-Watching Expert in a Cat Killing,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A15.
64
Louisiana is the only state that permits cockfighting. Oklahoma banned it in 2002,
and New Mexico banned it in March 2007. Several bills are currently being debated by
the Louisiana legislature that would end the cockfighting tradition. See Michael
Perlstein, In Cajun Country, A Fight to the Finish, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2007, at F1.
65
Steve Wyche, Vick’s Future Clouded Further, ATLANTA J. CONST., Sept. 26, 2007, at
A1. If convicted on the state charges, the judge could order the sentences to run
consecutively, as is typically the practice in Virginia, or concurrently. Id. The judge also
has the option of eliminating the state sentence based on time served in federal prison.
Id.
Beirne would likely regard Vick’s conviction and sentencing in federal district court
and his subsequent indictment on state charges as an exception rather than the rule,
noting that “even if particular acts of animal abuse are defined as cruel or otherwise
illegal, detection of them is quite rare and prosecution and conviction very difficult.”
Beirne, Nonspeciest, supra note 50, at 128 (citation omitted). In support of Beirne’s
pessimistic perspective, consider that felony animal cruelty charges were recently
dismissed against another Atlanta Falcon, defensive tackle Jonathan Babineaux, because
of insufficient evidence. See Judy Battista, Babineaux’s Felony Charge Dropped, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2007, at C31. More poignantly,
[l]ast year, the [American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals’]
cruelty hotline received more than 50,000 calls and determined that 4,191 . . .
were bona fide complaints. Of those, officers made arrests in 103 cases, or 2.5
percent. . . . Police agencies typically make arrests in a higher percentage of
cases, even for tough-to-solve crimes like burglary, where officials generally
push for clearance rates above 10 percent.
Glenn Collins, For “Animal Precinct,” Reality off Camera Is Subject to Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2007, at A18.
66
See Devin Burstein, Breed-Specific Legislation: Unfair Prejudice & Ineffective Policy,
10 ANIMAL L. 313 (2004); Karyn Grey, Breed-Specific Legislation Revisited: Canine
Racism or the Answer To Florida’s Dog Control Problems?, 27 NOVA L. REV. 415
(2003); Safia Gray Hussain, Attacking the Dog-Bite Epidemic: Why Breed-Specific
Legislation Won’t Solve the Dangerous-Dog Dilemma, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2847
(2006); Lynn Marmer, Comment, The New Breed of Municipal Dog Control Laws: Are
They Constitutional?, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1067 (1984); Sallyanne K. Sullivan, Banning
the Pit Bull: Why Breed-Specific Legislation is Constitutional, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV.
279 (1988); see also Rebecca J. Huss, No Pets Allowed: Housing Issues and Companion
Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. 69, 110 (2005).
Note that at least twelve states prohibit local municipalities from passing breedspecific legislation on the grounds that such bans are costly and impractical to enforce
because breeds are often difficult to identify and many dogs are of mixed breed. See Ian
Urbina, States Try To Weigh Safety with Dog Owners’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007,
at A10.
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Note also that some insurance companies will exclude certain breeds of dogs from
coverage under homeowners’ insurance policies. While such “breed discrimination” in
insurance is often prohibited, “[h]omeowners and renters who own certain breeds of dogs
may have difficulty getting certain insurance companies to underwrite policies, and it is
difficult to prove that ownership of a disfavored breed caused the insurance company to
refuse to underwrite insurance.” Bednarik, supra note 51, at 89; see also Larry
Cunningham, The Case Against Breed Discrimination by Homeowners’ Insurance
Companies, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2004).
67
Urbina, supra note 66, at A10.
68
Id. In Texas, a conviction carries with it a possible ten-year prison sentence. See TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 822.005(a), (b) (2007); Robert Fugate, Survey of Texas
Animal Torts, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 427, 433–34 (2006); Urbina, supra note 66. Echoing
Beirne, Nonspeciest, supra note 50, as well as the statistics cited by Collins, supra note
65, Urbina states that “[e]ven with stiffer penalties, animal control departments are often
under-financed and therefore unable to apply the laws.” Urbina, supra note 66, at A10.
69
Avi Brisman, Meth Chic and the Tyranny of the Immediate: Reflections on the
Culture-Drug/Drug-Crime Relationships, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1273, 1278 (2007) (footnotes
omitted).
70
Rosa del Olmo, The Ecological Impact of Illicit Drug Cultivation and Crop
Eradication Programs in Latin America, 2 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 269, 270–72
(1998). As she further explains:
[C]oca cultivation contaminates first, because of cultivation itself and, second,
because of the elaboration of basic cocaine paste. In the first case, the need to
obtain bigger leaf production leads to the use of chemical fertilizers above
normal levels, and monocultivation favours plagues against which plaguicides
are used, contaminating the land and the environment. In the second case,
very toxic chemicals are required such as sulphuric acid, acetone, quick lime,
kerosene plus toilet paper. The residues of all these products end up in the
rivers. Official estimates indicate that the Peruvian Amazonia has lost 700,000
hectares in the last 15 years due to coca cultivation.
Id. at 271 (internal citation omitted). Elsewhere, del Olmo adds “regional violence” to
this list of environmental impacts, which as discussed in infra Part II.C, can cause
significant ecological damage. Id. at 272.
71
Id. at 272.
72
Id. at 273.
73
Id. Del Olmo adds that while these three herbicides have been used most frequently to
destroy marijuana and poppy plants, “[a]s time goes by, and the war on drugs hardens,
new herbicides have been produced and applied, making it more difficult to determine
which ones are actually in use.” Id.
74
South, supra note 8, at 219–20. For additional research on the environmental and
human health problems posed by both illicit drug production and drug crop destruction,
see Rosa del Olmo, Aerobiology and the War on Drugs: A Transnational Crime, 30
CRIME & SOC. JUST. 28, 28–44 (1987). For additional research on the law enforcement
and military impacts on the environment, see, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE
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ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1987); THE GENDERED NEW
WORLD ORDER: MILITARISM, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Jennifer Turpin

& Lois Ann Lorentzen eds., 1996).
Del Olmo, supra note 70, at 275–76.
76
Id. at 275.
77
Id. at 276.
78
Duncan Brack, Combatting International Environmental Crime, 12 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 143, 143 (2002). See Seager, supra note 8, at 59 (“[L]arge-scale environmental
problems are the result of control exercised by people within very particular clusters of
powerful institutions, that include, prominently, militaries, multinationals, and
governments, which often act in collusion.”).
79
Brack, supra note 78, at 143.
80
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(B) (2006).
81
See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2006).
82
Brack, supra note 78, at 147 (“The growth of environmental crime is a serious side
effect of the development of policies aimed at protecting the environment.”); see also
Nigel South & Piers Beirne, Introduction to GREEN CRIMINOLOGY, in GREEN
CRIMINOLOGY 2006, at xiii, xxiii (The Int’l Library of Criminology, Criminal Justice &
Penology, Second Series).
83
Brack, supra note 78, at 144; see also Carter, supra note 26, at 32–42 (offering a case
study illustrating how an environmental law loophole—the unpermitted dumping of
construction and demolition materials (C&D)—was exploited by organized crime);
Pearce & Tombs, supra note 5, at 433, 439 (“[I]t is both possible and desirable that
industry be subject to more punitive forms of regulation . . . . It is only the fear of
effective legal sanctions that will make management genuinely safety-conscious.”);
Stephen J. Dubner & Steven D. Levitt, Unintended Consequences: Why Do WellMeaning Laws Backfire?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 20, 2008, at 18–19 (describing how the
Endangered Species Act may be creating “perverse incentives” that actually endanger
rather than protect species); Elisabeth Rosenthal, In Europe, the Catch of the Day Is
Often Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, at A1 (“Even when permits and treaties make
the fishing [practices off the coast of West Africa] illegal, it is not always sustainable.”).
See ATHANASIOU, supra note 5, at 136 (discussing how countries “whose environmental
movements are less influential, whose laws are less rigorous, whose administrators are
less vigilant, and whose economies are less affluent than the ones ‘at home’” are highly
susceptible to shipments of toxic incinerator ash from rich countries.).
84
Brack, supra note 78, at 144. According to Brack, illegal activities stemming from the
failure to enforce existing laws include the “suitability of regulation/enforcement
methodology and costs of compliance, regulatory capture, lack of resources and
infrastructure, political will and/or expertise, corruption, and political and economic
disruption.” Id.; see also Alvazzi del Frate & Norberry, supra note 29, at 7, 13, 16;
Carter, supra note 26, at 41–42, 48–49; Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 30, at 483
(“Enforcing international obligations has always been a problem in international law.”);
Raffi Khatchadourian, Neptune’s Navy, NEW YORKER, Nov. 5, 2007, at 56, 69 (“The
Ecuadorian Navy, which monitors and controls the movement of all ships in [the
Galapagos National Park—a marine protected area], is reluctant to fight environmental
75
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crimes and, at times, has blocked other agencies from combating them.”). See generally
Rosemarie Gillespie, Ecocide, Industrial Chemical Contamination, and the Corporate
Profit Imperative: The Case of Bougainville, SOC. JUST., Winter 1996, at 109 (describing
how the case of Bougainville highlights the nature of the conflict between “[c]orporate
interests and the role of state violence in protecting these interests” and “[t]he interests of
peoples in protecting their land and environment from destruction by mining and its
industrial by-products”); Pearce & Tombs, supra note 5, at 439, 440 (asserting that “there
is a need for the criminal law in this area to be strictly and consistently enforced,” but
recognizing that “[t]he parameters of capitalist social relations place real limits on how
far such reforms can proceed”); White, Sydney Water, supra note 13, at 218 (“Politically,
governments which are materially and ideologically supportive of corporatisation and
privatisation will tend to not want to undermine such processes by appearing to intervene
too heavily in private corporate affairs. Neo-liberalism is precisely oriented toward less,
rather than more, government regulation of corporate activity.”); Peter Maass, The Fuel
Fixers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 23, 2007, at 26 (“[I]n an era of scarce oil, can America
afford to punish anyone who cuts corners to win deals for American firms? In 2003,
when oil sold for less than $30 a barrel, it was possible to believe we could have our
anticorruption statutes and our cheap gasoline. Four years later, with oil going for $95 a
barrel, it’s not so clear. . . . The choice is simple: Make painful but necessary changes to
reduce our addiction to oil, or sink deeper into our moral sludge.”).
Note that the absence of regulatory infrastructure can lead to the failure to enforce
existing laws, as can “implementation gaps,” Alvazzi del Frate & Norberry, supra note
29, at 7–8, 16, and the tragedy of the “regulatory commons,” whereby numerous
regulators share potential jurisdiction over a regulatory opportunity, resulting in no action
by any of the regulators. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons, 89
IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003).
85
Id. Brack, supra note 78, at 144.
86
Carter, supra note 26, at 31, 32, 43–49; Andrew Szasz, Corporations, Organized
Crime, and the Disposal of Hazardous Waste: An Examination of the Making of a
Criminogenic Regulatory Structure, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1986).
87
Brack, supra note 78, at 143–46. See generally Susan Saulny, Timber Thieves Strike
at the Heart of Lands Held Dear, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2008, at 13 (describing how the
rise in timber value and increase in worldwide demand for timber has resulted in timber
theft in the United States, and comparing illegal logging in the United States to “countries
like Indonesia, Malawi and Brazil, where unauthorized harvesting has led to serious
deforestation and attendant environmental problems”).
For a discussion of illegal logging in Malawi, for example, see Michael Wines,
Malawi Is Burning, and Deforestation Erodes Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at
A3 (describing how illegal loggers have “laid waste” to half the country and that
“Malawi’s impoverished millions could benefit from saving the woods instead of clearing
them,” but noting that “[i]n few places do the dictates of modern environmentalism butt
so painfully against economic reality as they do . . . in Malawi. . . . For hundreds of
thousands of . . . rural dwellers, sales of firewood and charcoal provide virtually their
only income.”).
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For a discussion of illegal fishing off the West African coast, to offer another example,
see Sharon Lafraniere, Europe Takes Africa’s Fish, and Migrants Follow, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2008, at A1 (describing how illegal fishing and overfishing have resulted in the
collapse of many of northwest Africa’s fisheries, creating economically dire situations in
many coastal communities); Rosenthal, supra note 83, at A1 (“[F]ish are poised to
become Europe’s most precious contraband.”); see also Editorial, Until All the Fish Are
Gone, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2008, at A20 (summarizing the disastrous environmental,
economic, and human consequences of illegal industrial fishing). It bears mention that
overfishing off the West Africa coast—much of it illegal—has resulted in another type of
illegal activity, widespread attempts at illegal immigration to Europe in the hopes of
better economic opportunities. See Lafraniere, supra.
88
Szasz, supra note 86, at 3.
89
Id.; see also Scarpitti & Block, Racket, supra note 36, at 120, 125. See Brack, supra
note 78, at 28, 31 (“[W]herever law is enforced, some corruption exists . . . there will,
apparently, always be those who will attempt to circumvent the intended controls.”).
Note that this situation is not peculiar to the United States. Referring to the
phenomenon as “environmental blackmail,” Williams writes:
The degree to which the environment will become a vehicle for domestic and
international blackmail is difficult to predict and little thought has been given
to possible responses. On the domestic level, threats equate with other forms
of blackmail. The Mafia has taken an interest in toxic waste in the U.S. and
Italy, which extends to threats to dump waste on private land if landowners do
not pay up. (This gives a new meaning to the term ‘environmental
protection’!). In 1994, most of Lithuania was without electricity for a day
because of a Mafia bomb threat at a nuclear power station. It was not reported
whether money changed hands, but the incident raises the possible specter of
‘double blackmail,’ in which a poor state turns to its wealthy neighbors and
suggests that they might pay the sum demanded, because they are just as likely
to suffer if the treat is carried out.
Williams, supra note 18, at 31; see also ATHANASIOU, supra note 5, at 134–38
(discussing organized crime’s involvement in the Russia’s forest resources—“forest
mafias”—as well as “waste mafias,” who have been smuggling toxic garbage throughout
Eastern Europe).
For a recent example of mafia interest in waste, see, for example, Elena Ferrante, Our
Fetid City, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 2008, at A21 (describing how in Naples, “organized
crime controls the garbage industry and runs a staggering number of illegal dumps”); Ian
Fisher, In Mire of Politics and the Mafia, Garbage Reigns, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at
A1 (“There is also the problem of the Camorra, which profits extraordinarily in the
endless crisis over trash, much as arms dealers thrive in war. The Camorra controls many
of the trucks and workers used to haul away trash. But it also operates illegal dumps used
more in times of crisis—and far more harmful than legal ones to humans and the
environment.”).
90
Szasz, supra note 86, at 4. See Brack, supra note 78, at 28 (“[C]rime syndicates have
benefited indirectly (and probably unexpectedly) from the failure of the regulators to treat
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environmental crime as tantamount to serious traditional crime.”). As South further
explains:
In New Jersey, for example, organized crime had controlled the garbage
industry through ownership of garbage hauling firms, through ownership of or
control of landfills, and through labor racketeering. The new regulations
governing hazardous waste would have had to have been carefully written and
tenaciously enforced were organized crime to be kept from applying this
highly developed infrastructure to the new market. In fact, as will be shown
below, the opposite happened and organized crime easily entered both the
hauling and the disposal phases of the hazardous waste handling industry . . . .
In retrospect, it is hardly surprising that, given the opportunity, organized
crime would enter the newly created market for hazardous waste handling. It
was an extension of their current business activity. They had the equipment
and organization. They had both the know-how and the will to corrupt the
manifest system. It was an attractive prospect. Both the potential size of the
market and the potential profits were enormous. Even if they charged only a
fraction of the true price of legitimate disposal, that price would be much
higher than the price they charged to move the same stuff when it was legally
just garbage, but their operating expenses would stay the same (if they
commingled hazardous waste with ordinary garbage) or decrease (if they
simply dumped). Why organized crime would want to enter into relationship
with corporate generators when the opportunity presented itself needs no
subtle unraveling.
Szasz, supra note 86, at 8, 10 (citations omitted).
91
Szasz, supra note 86, at 4; see also South, supra note 8, at 216 (“[RCRA] provided
new opportunities for the participation of organized crime in the hazardous waste haulage
and disposal industries. The corporate generators of such waste pressured for a weak
regulatory structure which produced a disposal market highly vulnerable to criminal
infiltration—this may not have been their intention but it was certainly a market
development from which they subsequently benefited.”).
92
South, supra note 8, at 216.
93
Szasz, supra note 86, at 2 n.1.
94
Id. at 19, 23–24.
95
See generally CULLEN & AGNEW, supra note 23, at 295–96; Mark Halsey, Green
Criminology, supra note 4, at 833 (“[G]lobal depletions of biodiversity, as well as
human-induced declinations in air, water and soil quality, are chronic processes rather
than fleeting events. . . . [T]hey are fundamentally linked to the ‘normal’ operation of
various political, cultural and economic practices.”); Pearce & Tombs, supra note 5, at
425, 431 (“Even if a corporation wished to act with a primary commitment to social
responsibility, this would entail ignoring the very rationale of the corporation and the
nature of the existing economic system. . . . The hegemony of corporate ideology . . . has
facilitated the representation of arguments for greater external regulation of corporations
as being both in principle unjust and counter-productive; indeed, such is the power of this
ideology that the exigencies of business—most fundamentally, accumulation—at times
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appear to be, and are represented as being, morally superior to the exigencies of law.”);
White, Sydney Water, supra note 13, at 216 (discussing how, when a profit-oriented
company is placed in charge of providing drinking water for a city, “efforts will be made
to reduce costs associated with production.”).
96
Brack, supra note 78, at 31–32; see also Scarpitti & Block, Racket, supra note 26, at
115–28.
97
Szasz, supra note 86, at 3.
98
South, supra note 8, at 226. For additional perspectives on why organized crime
expanded its solid waste operations into other aspects of the waste-handling industry and
how they succeeded in protecting their illicit affairs, see, for example, ALAN A. BLOCK &
WILLIAM J. CHAMBLISS, ORGANIZING CRIME (1981); ALAN A. BLOCK & FRANK
SCARPITTI, POISONING FOR PROFIT: THE MAFIA AND TOXIC WASTE IN AMERICA (1985);
DONALD J. REBOVICH, DANGEROUS GROUND: THE WORLD OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
CRIME (1992); Alan A. Block & Thomas J. Bernard, Crime in the Waste Oil Industry, 9
DEVIANT BEHAV. 113 (1988); Alan A. Block, Defending the Mountaintop: A Campaign
Against Environmental Crime, in GLOBAL CRIME CONNECTIONS: DYNAMICS AND
CONTROL (Frank Pearce & Michael Woodiwiss eds., 1993); Alan A. Block, “On the
Waterfront” Revisited: The Criminology of Waterfront Organized Crime, 6 CONTEMP.
CRISIS 373 (1982); Frank Pearce & Steve Tombs, Hazards, Law and Class:
Contextualising the Regulation of Corporate Crime, 6 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 79 (1997);
Frank Pearce & Steve Tombs, US Capital Versus the Third World: Union Carbide and
Bhopal, in GLOBAL CRIME CONNECTIONS, supra, at 187; Scarpitti & Block, Racket,
supra note 36, at 115–28.
99
Monica Davey, Sober North Dakotans Hope To Legalize Cannabis Without the Kick,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2007, at A1.
100
Id.; see also ENVTL. TECHS. ACTION PLAN, CONCRETE APPLICATIONS OF HEMP IN
SUSTAINABLE CONSTRUCTION (2006), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/etap/pdfs/may
06_hemp.pdf.
101
Davey, supra note 99, at A1; see also Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §
812(c)(17) (2006).
102
For example, and as alluded to in the text, hemp may be a potentially viable biomass
fuel, it has proven to be an effective alternative to cotton (which uses a large amount of
pesticides, fertilizers, and water), and it is a sturdy and effective construction material
that reduces the need for air conditioning because of its insulating properties. See, e.g.,
ENVTL. TECHS. ACTION PLAN, supra note 100; Any Questions: What Are the
Environmental Benefits to Using Cloth Versus Disposable Diapers? What Types of Cloth
Diapers Are Available?, ENVIROZINE, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.ec.gc.ca/EnviroZine/
english/ issues/45/any_questions_e.cfm.
103
Davey, supra note 99.
104
See, e.g., Brief and Addendum of Appellants David Monson and Wayne Hauge,
Monson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., No. 07-3837 (8th Cir. Feb. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.votehemp.com/PDF/Monson_v_DEA_appeal_to_eighth_circuit.pdf;
Vote
Hemp, Legal Cases: North Dakota, http://www.votehemp.com/legal_cases_ND.html#
Overview (last visited Apr. 26, 2008).
105
Davey, supra note 99.
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106

Id.
As expressed above, for the sake of clarity, this article refers to the “socio-legal
approach” or “environmental justice perspective” as simply the “socio-legal approach.”
See discussion supra note 27.
108
South & Beirne, supra note 82, at xiii.
109
Lynch, supra note 5, at 165.
110
Id. at 166–67. Lynch listed these as follows:
107

(1) the study of crimes committed against humanity through environmental
destruction; (2) the study of laws, treaties and movements designed to promote
sound environmental practices that protect the destruction of human, plant and
animal life; (3) examinations of the successes and failures of governments and
corporations to protect humans and animals from environmental hazards; (4)
the study of specific governmental and corporate practices and social trends
that destroy the environment and thereby threaten the survival of humans,
animals and plants; (5) the study of reckless, negligent or willful destruction of
humans and animals through misuse of he [sic] environment or environmental
predidation; (6) examination of the testing of chemical compounds of
commodities and chemicals that have negative effects on all forms of living
organisms; and (7) the study of hunger and homelessness as the product of
corporatism, individualism, greed, corruption, poor planning, overuse/poor use
of land, excessive pesticide use, etc.
Id.
111

Id. at 167.
South & Beirne, supra note 82, at xiii.
113
Id. at xv.
114
See, e.g., Editorial, Nature’s Revenge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at A22; cf. David
Brooks, Katrina’s Silver Lining, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at A29 (claiming that
“Katrina was a natural disaster that interrupted a social disaster”—significant urban
poverty in New Orleans).
115
Nature’s Revenge, supra note 114; THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A NATURAL
DISASTER: RACE, CLASS, AND HURRICANE KATRINA (Gregory Squires & Chester
Hartman eds., 2006); see also Cornelia Dean, From the Air, Scientists Comb a Ruined
Coastline for Clues and Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at D1 [hereinafter Dean,
Coastline] (describing damage to barrier islands and other uninhabited islands of Gulf
Islands National Seashore as a “matter of interference by people” and “‘a human
tragedy’” (quoting Robert S. Young, Duke University Program for the Study of
Developed Shorelines)); Cornelia Dean, Some Question Protective Role of Marshes, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at D4 [hereinafter Dean, Question] (“It is practically an article of
faith in Louisiana that if the state’s marshes had not been allowed to deteriorate over the
years, New Orleans and other flooded areas would have been preserved from the
devastation of Hurricane Katrina.”). See HALSEY, DELEUZE, supra note 5, at 20 (“The
depletion of China’s and Russia’s forests, for instance, owed/owes as much to the human
desire for fuel, food and shelter under Asiatic (that is, non-capitalist) modes of production
as it does to the ravages wrought by successive natural disasters (which, in any case, can
112
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no longer be viewed as independent of human conduct).”); Andrew C. Revkin, The
Future Of Calamity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2005, at § 4:1, 4 (“[C]atastrophes are as much
the result of human choices as they are of geology or hydrology.”).
116
Revkin, supra note 115.
117
See, e.g., Richard Bernstein, The View from Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at
WK5 (reporting that “[a] few environmentalists in Europe seized on the situation
[Katrina] to express one of their greatest irritations: the unwillingness of the Bush
administration to sign the Kyoto Protocol,” and quoting Jürgen Trittin, minister of the
environment in Germany, for the proposition that “[t]he American president has closed
his eyes to the economic and human damage that natural catastrophes such as Katrina—
in other words, disasters caused by a lack of climate protection measures—can visit on
his country”).
118
Dean, Coastline, supra note 115.
119
Nature’s Revenge, supra note 114. See also Cornelia Dean, Louisiana’s Marshes
Fight for Their Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at D1 (describing how wetland loss
was due to “the longstanding practice of interfering with marsh—for flood control,
navigation, agriculture, oil or other gain—in hopes that engineering could restore it”
(citing Oliver Houck, professor of law, Tulane University School of Law)); Nature’s
Revenge, supra note 114 (“[S]ystematic levee-building along the Mississippi upstream of
New Orleans has blocked much of the natural flow of silt into the delta. That, in turn has
caused the delta to subside and made the city and its environs even more vulnerable to the
waters of the Gulf of Mexico, which itself has been rising.”).
120
John Tierney, A Case for a Cover-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2005, at A27
(maintaining that “[e]verybody anticipated the breach of the levees,” and that both
Democrats and Republicans are responsible for shortchanging projects that could have
protected New Orleans from the flood).
121
According to Robert S. Young and David M. Bush, professors of geology at Western
Carolina University and the University of West Georgia, respectively:
First, many people—scientists and otherwise—have insinuated that if we
had begun wetlands restoration in the Mississippi Delta years ago, it would
have reduced the impact of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans and the coast.
This is highly unlikely. Storm surge waters approached the coast from the
east, pushed into Lake Pontchartrain by the counterclockwise flow of the
hurricane’s winds; the natural wetlands that used to exist downriver from the
city would have done little to mitigate the damage.
Second, some have suggested that rebuilding the Louisiana barrier islands
would protect the delta region in future storms. But just look what happened
elsewhere: Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge quickly inundated the barrier
islands of the Gulf Islands National Seashore off Mississippi, which are far
more robust and vegetated than the Louisiana islands ever were, on its way to
devastating the state’s shoreline. Let’s face it, even if reconstructed, the
Louisiana islands would be little more than a speed bump to a storm the size of
Hurricane Katrina.
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In addition, none of the restoration plans address the root causes of wetland
loss: man-made alterations to the Mississippi that reduce the amount of
sediment flowing into the marshes, the saltwater allowed in by navigation
canals cut through the delta, and a lowering of ground levels throughout the
region brought on by natural and industrial activities.
Robert S. Young & David M. Bush, Forced Marsh, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at A27.
Compare Dean, Question, supra note 115 (“[T]he floodwater that caused the most
damage in New Orleans entered the city not from the marshes but from Lake
Pontchartrain and, possibly, the Mississippi Gulf Outlet, a much-reviled canal that runs
from the river at New Orleans southeast to the gulf.”), with Editorial, Redemption in the
Bayou, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2007, at A22 (“[New Orleans’] heart-rending tragedy is
partly traceable to years of federal efforts to manage the Mississippi River in ways that it
did not intend to be managed, keeping it from going where it wanted to go and thus
weakening the natural defenses that might have spared the city the worst. . . . The
problem, in a nutshell is this: the Louisiana coast, its protective fringe of barrier and
coastal marshlands, is disappearing. Over the last 75 years, 1.9 million acres have
vanished. Every year, another 25 square miles, an area roughly the size of Manhattan,
sinks quietly beneath the waves. In some places, the coastline has receded 15 miles from
where it was in the 1920’s.”).
122
This is not to suggest that investigations—especially investigations into Washington’s
slow response to Katrina’s victims—would not uncover violations of existing laws.
123
For an additional perspective on how Hurricane Katrina resulted in “harm” under a
“socio-legal approach”/“environmental justice perspective,” see Michael Wines, Drought
Deepens Poverty, Starving More Africans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1 (reporting
that Hurricane Katrina helped drive up the price of corn—a staple in Malawi—thereby
exacerbating hunger for millions of Malawians and other southern Africans).
124
John Jay College Student Work Brigade, Manifesto of New Orleans, NEW ORLEANS
INDEP. MEDIA CTR., Apr. 27, 2007, http://neworleans.indymedia.org/news/2007/04/
10167.php; see also Manolo de los Santos, Claudia de La Cruz & Angela Carrasco, John
Jay College, New Orleans: It Was Not a Natural Disaster; It was Murder!, Address at On
the Edge: Transgression and the Dangerous Other, an Interdisciplinary Conference
Presented by John Jay College of Criminal Justice and The Graduate Center at City
University of New York (Aug. 10, 2007) (referring specifically to how the depletion of
the wetlands resulted in the failure of the levees when the hurricane came).
125
For example, French sociologist Émile Durkheim, in contemplating how social order
is maintained in different types of societies, contends that laws and legal sanctions reflect
the “conscience collective” (or “collective conscience”) of a given society, and that
punishment reinforces social solidarity by expressing outrage at violations and
transgressions of the society’s moral code. See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF
LABOR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson trans., 1964). For an examination of Durkheim and
his theses regarding the relationship of law and punishment to social solidarity, see, for
example, DURKHEIM AND THE LAW (Steven Lukes & Andrew Scull eds., 1983); DAVID
GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 2–81
(1990); STEVEN LUKES, ÉMILE DURKHEIM: HIS LIFE AND WORK (1973).
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126

See Leslie Eaton, Judge Steps in for Poor Inmates Without Justice Since Hurricane,
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at A1 (reporting that more than nine months after Hurricane
Katrina, many criminal defendants remained behind bars because they had no access to
lawyers, and the public defenders’ office was short-staffed and broke).
127
Adam Nossiter, With Regrets, New Orleans Is Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2007, at A1.
128
See GEORGE B. VOLD, THOMAS J. BERNARD & JEFFREY B. SNIPES, THEORETICAL
CRIMINOLOGY (4th ed. 1998) (“[L]ooting often accompanies large-scale disasters such as
floods, earthquakes, violent storms, wars, and riots. Home owners and store owners flee
the disaster, leaving their property unprotected. The police often are busy with more
pressing matters, such as saving human lives. Many people who normally would not
commit crime take advantage of the opportunities in the situation and steal whatever they
think they can get away with.”); Robert D. Kaplan, Next: A War Against Nature, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2005, at A27 (“When such disasters occur, security systems break down
and lawlessness erupts. The first effect of the earthquake in the Pakistani town of
Muzaffarabad was widespread looting—just as in New Orleans.”).
129
This is not to suggest that all the looting that transpired in the immediate aftermath of
Katrina was survival oriented or inspired. Plenty of individuals viewed the breakdown of
the rule of law as an opportunity to steal televisions and other luxury items—a
phenomenon evidenced by the fact that looting has continued in some poor and/or
sparsely populated neighborhoods. See Susan Saulny, Crime Rising, New Orleans Asks
for National Guard, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2006, at A10.
130
Benedict Carey, Storm Will Have a Long-Term Emotional Effect on Some, Experts
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at §1:26 (citing Suzanne Yates, psychologist, Lehman
College).
131
Id. (quoting Elliot Aronson, psychologist, University of California at Santa Cruz).
132
Nossiter, supra note 127 (noting that murder claimed the lives of about two hundred
individuals in New Orleans in 2007). See Christopher Drew, Police Struggles in New
Orleans Raise Old Fears, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2006, at A1; Saulny, supra note 129.
133
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
134
See ATHANASIOU, supra note 5, at 120–41; DAVID DAY, THE ECO-WARS (1996); see
also Richard A. Falk, Environmental Warfare and Ecocide—Facts, Appraisal, and
Proposals, 4 SECURITY DIALOGUE 80, 80–96 (1973) (describing how targeting the
environment was a specific military strategy during the Vietnam War); George Johnson,
A Question of Blame When Societies Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2007, at D1 (describing
how the inhabitants of Easter Island and the Pitcairn Islands, as well as the Anasazi of
Chaco Canyon, the Maya, and the Norse of Greenland, might have committed “ecocide,”
contributing to the decline and collapse of their civilizations). See generally STUART
KIRSCH, REVERSE ANTHROPOLOGY: INDIGENOUS ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS IN NEW GUINEA (2006); Pellow & Brulle, Power, supra
note 5, at 1, 19 (describing the “war on nature” and the “war against nature”).
The use of “eco-war” to refer to “ecocide” is a bit confusing because the term ecowarrior is frequently employed to describe environmental activists who engage in direct
action and other confrontational or aggressive means of safeguarding natural resources
and protecting the environment—a far cry from ecocide. See, e.g., DAVE FOREMAN,
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CONFESSIONS OF AN ECO-WARRIOR (1991) [hereinafter FOREMAN, ECO-WARRIOR];
ROBERT HUNTER, WARRIORS OF THE RAINBOW: A CHRONICLE OF THE GREENPEACE
MOVEMENT (1979); DAVID B. MORRIS, EARTH WARRIOR: OVERBOARD WITH PAUL
WATSON AND THE SEA SHEPHERD CONSERVATION SOCIETY (1995); PAUL WATSON,
EARTHFORCE (1993); PAUL WATSON, OCEAN WARRIOR: MY BATTLE TO END THE
ILLEGAL SLAUGHTER ON THE HIGH SEAS (1996); PAUL WATSON, SEA SHEPHERD: MY
FIGHT FOR WHALES AND SEALS (1981); PAUL WATSON, SEAL WARS: TWENTY-FIVE
YEARS ON THE FRONT LINES WITH THE HARP SEALS (2003); Khatchadourian, supra note
84, at 56–72; Jeffrey “Free” Luers, How I Became an Ecowarrior, EARTH FIRST!, Mar.–
Apr. 2004, at 33, 33–35; Jeffrey “Free” Luers, How I Became an Ecowarrior Part II,
EARTH FIRST!, May–June 2004, at 39, 39–41; infra Part II.D. As such, this article uses
the term ecocide exclusively.
135
Gillespie, supra note 84.
136
See, e.g., HALSEY, DELEUZE, supra note 5, at 22 (describing ecofeminist theory and
stating, “[b]y excluding . . . key debates and issues, men, it is contended, can only
reinforce androcentrism and, its necessary corollary, ecocide.”); Gillespie, supra note 84
(describing discharge from the copper concentrator into the Kawerong River in
Bougainville, an island in the Solomon Islands; stating that “[a]luminum, heavy metals
such as mercury, cadmium, lead, zinc, and arsenic, contributed to the ecocide;” and
proclaiming that “[o]ut of this harmony there emerged, as if from some poisoned seed,
people whose love of power was greater than their love of life itself. . . . Hierarchy
replaced harmony and the natural cooperation between peoples was replaced by coercion
and violence. War, rather than reason, consultation, and consensus, became the final
arbiter. . . . Greed and exploitation were proclaimed virtues. Corporate superstructures
grew like parasites in the nation-states that harbored them.”).
137
See, e.g., EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR: MITIGATING THE ENVIRONMENTAL
EFFECTS (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1985); Andrew Leibler, Deliberate Wartime
Environmental Damage: New Challenges to International Law, 23 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 67
(1992); Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 30, at 405 n.2, 408 nn.16 & 19.
138
Sylvie Groult, One Year on, War Pollution Still Stains Lebanon’s Shores, ILOUBNAN,
Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.americanintifada.com/2007/08/08-07-13.htm.
139
See, e.g., WILLIAM THOMAS, BRINGING THE WAR HOME 137 (1998); Richard Lacayo,
A War Against the Earth, TIME, Feb. 4, 1991, at 28; Williams, supra note 18, at 31;
Jeffrey Pollack, Oil Spill: After the Deluge, DUKE MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2003, available at
http://www.dukemagazine.duke.edu/dukemag/issues/030403/oil1.html.
Note that the Iraqi attacks on Kuwati oil fields have also been referred to as
“ecological terrorism,” “environmental terrorism,” and “ecoterrorism.” See, e.g., Low &
Hodgkinson, supra note 30, at 406, 423, 430 (explaining that the Gulf War has been
termed an “eco-war” and that Iraq’s actions have been considered “environmental
terrorism” (citing Lacayo, supra; Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Calls Gulf Oil Spill a “Sick”
Act by Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1991, at L5)); Jessica E. Seacor, Note,
Environmental Terrorism: Lessons from the Oil Fires of Kuwait, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 481 (1994); Bernard A. Weintraub, Environmental Security, Environmental
Management, and Environmental Justice, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 533, 536 (1995);
Kristin D. Wheeler, Note, Homeland Security and Environmental Regulation: Balancing
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Long-Term Environmental Goals with Immediate Security Needs, 45 WASHBURN L.J.
437, 464 (2006); infra Part II.D.
To give a sense of the magnitude of the volume of oil dumped into the Persian Gulf,
consider that the November 7, 2007, oil spill in the San Francisco Bay involved fiftyeight thousand gallons of fuel. See Jason Dearen, Criminal Probe Opened on Bay Oil
Spill, ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP) NEWSWIRE, Nov. 11, 2007; Carolyn Marshall, Crew
Involved in Bay Oil Spill Refuses To Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at A23; Carolyn
Marshall, U.S. Prosecutors Start Investigating Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007, at
A25; see also Charges in Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, at WK2; Oil Spill Pilot’s
Record Indicated Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2008, at A17; Ship’s Pilot Is Charged
in Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2007, at A14. The 1999 Exxon Valdez tanker disaster
spilled roughly 262,000 barrels of crude oil into Prince William Sound, Alaska; the 1979
Ixtoc oil well blowout in the Gulf of Mexico released close to 3.3 million barrels. See
Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 30, at 409.
For a discussion of the environmental impact of the first Gulf War, see, for example,
Frank Barnaby, The Environmental Impact of the Gulf War, 21 ECOLOGIST 166 (1991);
Florention Feliciano, Marine Pollution and Spoliation of Natural Resources as War
Measures: A Note on Some International Law Problems in the Gulf War, 14 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 483 (1992); Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 30, at 408–12; Glen Plant, Legal
Aspects of Marine Pollution During the Gulf War, 7 INT’L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L.
217 (1992); Marc A. Ross, Environmental Warfare and the Persian Gulf: Possible
Remedies To Combat International Destruction of the Environment, 10 DICK. J. INT’L L.
515 (1992).
140
See, e.g., Editorial, Whales in the Navy’s Way, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at A20;
Carolyn Marshall, Judge Imposes Stricter Rules On Navy to Protect Marine Life, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 5, 2008, at A8; Jesse McKinley, White House Exempts Navy from Sonar Ban,
Angering Environmental Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2008, at A18; Jesse McKinley,
Judge Reinstates Rules on Sonar, Criticizing Bush’s Waiver for Navy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5, 2008, at A20; Natural Resources Defense Council, Issues, Wildlife: Protecting Whales
from Dangerous Sonar, http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/sonar.asp (last visited Mar.
28, 2008). See generally Michael Janofsky, Pentagon Is Asking Congress to Loosen
Environmental Laws, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2005, at A14.
141
Seager, supra note 8, at 58, 59, 62.
142
Id. at 65 (footnote omitted); see also RUTH SIVARD, WORLD PRIORITIES INST.,
WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES, 1987–1988 (12th ed. 1987) (finding that
military and civilian programs must compete for limited national revenues and that high
levels of military spending result in fewer funds for civilian programs); John C.
Dernbach, Sustainable Development: Now More than Ever, in STUMBLING TOWARD
SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 33, at 45, 48 [hereinafter Dernbach, Sustainable] (“Money
spent on arms is money that is not used to meet basic human needs such as drinking
water and sanitation.”).
143
Seager, supra note 8, at 65.
144
Williams, supra note 18, at 31 (citing G.V. BACHLERBOGE, S. KLOTZLI & S.
LIBISZWESKI, THE DESTRUCTION OF NATURE AS A CAUSE OF CONFLICT (1993)); see
HALSEY, DELEUZE, supra note 5, at 44; Mark Halsey, Green Criminology, supra note 4,
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at 836 (“[O]ne of the greatest perpetrators of ecological damage is the (post-)modern
state.”); see also John C. Dernbach, Synthesis, in STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY,
supra note 33, at 1, 5 [hereinafter Dernbach, Synthesis] (“Although poverty and
environmental degradation are important in their own right, they also can cause or
contribute to wars, starvation, ethnic tensions, and terrorism, which are more likely to get
headlines than their underlining causes.”).
Although certain environmental problems and the scarcity of certain natural resources
can result in conflict and violence, one commentator notes that oil-rich countries are often
run by authoritarian regimes. According to this commentator, democracy, with its rights
and protections, appears to decline when oil revenues surge. See Janine di Giovanni,
Democratic Vistas, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Jan. 20, 2008, at 21 (reviewing LARRY
DIAMOND, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD FREE SOCIETIES
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (2008)).
145
Lydia Polgreen, A Godsend for Darfur, or a Curse?, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2007, at
§4:1,12. In the 1980s, droughts in Sudan forced migrations and other social changes and
increased competition for water and land between farmers (many of whom are non-Arab)
and herders (many of whom are Arab). Polgreen questions whether a newly discovered
lake in Sudan may help bring some deliverance from the conflict in Sudan. But John
Prendergast, a founder of the Enough Project, an initiative of the Center for American
Progress and the International Crisis Group to abolish genocide and mass atrocities,
claims that “[c]limate change and the lack of rain are much less important than the landuse patterns promoted by the government of Sudan and the development policies of
World Bank and I.M.F., which were focused on intensive agricultural expansion that
really mined the soils and left a lot of land unusable.” Id.
In a different vein, Kristof links China’s thirst for oil to the Darfur genocide. Echoing
Friedman’s comments regarding the relationship of U.S. lust for oil to violence and
conflict in Iraq, infra notes 147–50 and accompanying text, Kristof states that, “in
exchange for access to Sudanese oil, Beijing is financing, diplomatically protecting and
supplying the arms for the first genocide of the 21st century.” Nicholar Kristof, China’s
Genocide Olympics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2008, at A23.
146
According to Pellow and Brulle,
The evaluation of the EJ movement is of significance because, as economic
globalization continues at an unchecked pace, as the United States and other
industrialized nations continue to produce greater volumes of hazardous waste,
and as the level of social inequality in these societies also increases, the
frequency and intensity of environmental justice conflicts will also rise. These
conflicts will become more routine in the United States and in the global South
as global North nations continue dumping waste in both domestic and global
“pollution havens” where the cost of doing business is much cheaper,
regulation is virtually non-existent, and residents do not hold much formal
political power. In some cases, these practices have nearly led to military
confrontations among nations, threatening geopolitical stability.
Pellow & Brulle, Power, supra note 5, at 10–11.
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147

See, e.g., Katie Zezima, Rice’s Appearance Draws Protests in Boston, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 2006, at A21; BloodForOil.org, http://www.bloodforoil.org/ (last visited Mar.
26, 2008); David Truskoff, No Blood for Oil, COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG, Oct. 5, 2006,
http://www.countercurrents.org/us-truskoff051006.htm.
148
Thomas L. Friedman, A Quick Fix for the Gas Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2006, at
A19; see also Josh Lauer, Drive to Extremes: Fear of Crime and the Rise of the Sport
Utility Vehicle in the United States, CRIME MEDIA CULTURE, Mar. 2005, at 149, 165, 166
(discussing how sports utility vehicles (SUVs) pose “a threat to national security by
fostering American over-reliance on oil from the Middle East,” and concluding that “[i]f
the SUV provided a haven of euphemistic safety and space for upwardly mobile
Americans during the 1980s and 1990s, it did so at considerable social, environmental,
and (arguably) geo-political cost”).
149
In California, the 2006 and 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe and Suburban (half-ton models
only); Impala and Monte Carlo sedans; G.M.C. Yukon and Yukon XL SUVs (half-ton
models only); Hummer H2 and H3 SUVs; the Cadillac SRX SUV; and the Pontiac Grand
Prix and Buick Lucerne sedans. In Florida, the 2006 and 2007 Chevrolet Impala and
Monte Carlo; Pontiac Grand Prix and Buick LaCrosse. Friedman, supra note 148. The
Hummer H2, weighing in at 6,400 pounds, averages roughly nine miles per gallon; the
Chevy Suburban, around fifteen miles per gallon. Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.; see also Dernbach, Sustainable, supra note 142, at 46, 47, 59 (“The terrorist acts
of September 11, 2001, reinforce rather than diminish the importance of sustainable
development. . . . Social and economic development are impossible in the absence of
peace. . . . Sustainable development is not antagonistic to a campaign against terrorism; it
requires that campaign.”); John C. Dernbach, Synthesis, supra note 144, at 1, 7 (noting
the linkages between economic, social, environmental, and security goals).
152
There does, however, appear to be good support for the reverse proposition—that the
presence of military Humvees in Iraq spurred interest in the civilian version, the
Hummer, in the United States. See Lauer, supra note 148, at 163–66.
153
Phil MacNaghten & John Urry, Towards a Sociology of Nature, 29 SOCIOLOGY 203,
210 (1995).
154
Lynch & Stretsky, supra note 5, at 231.
155
Dogfighting Operation Broken Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at A30; see also
Dozen More Sought in Union Parish Dogfighting Operation, KTBS 3 NEWS, Dec. 18,
2007, available at http://www.ktbs.com/news/Dozen-more-sought-in-Union-Parishdogfighting-operation-7229/.
156
Robert Agnew, The Cause of Animal Abuse: A Social-Psychological Analysis, 2
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 177, 179 (1998).
157
For a definition of abuse, see id. at 179 (noting, among other factors, that “abuse may
be physical (including sexual) or mental, may involve active maltreatment or passive
neglect, may be direct or indirect”).
158
See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW (1995); CLIFFORD J.
SHERRY, ANIMAL RIGHTS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK (1994); MURRAY A. STRAUS,
BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES
(1994); Agnew, supra note 156, at 179 (“Most of the harm on animals is legal.”).
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159

Beirne, Nonspeciest, supra note 50, at 128–29.
Halsey, Green Criminology, supra note 4, at 837 n.6.
161
Agnew, supra note 156, at 180. Agnew makes clear, however, that he is neither the
first, nor alone, in making such claims: “This argument, of course, has been made by
conflict theorists and others. And some of the best work in criminology has called
attention to harmful although non-criminal acts, including work in the areas of family
violence and white-collar crime.” Id. (citations omitted).
162
Id. at 180–81 (citations omitted); see also Perlstein, supra note 64, at D1
(“[Cockfighting is] cruel and barbaric and it desensitizes people to violence. This needs
to be banned immediately, and for a ban to be enforceable, it needs to be a felony.”
(quoting Laura Maloney, director, Louisiana Society for the Protection of Animals)).
Note that for some ecofeminists, cruelty to women results in cruelty to animals, rather
than vice versa. See, e.g., HALSEY, DELEUZE, supra note 5, at 26 (“‘Feminine suffering
is universal because wrong done to women and its ongoing denial fuel the psychosexual
abuse of all others—race, children, animals, plants, rocks, water, and air.’” (quoting A.
SALLEH, ECOFEMINISM AS POLITICS: NATURE, MARX AND THE POSTMODERN 14
(1997))).
163
Beirne, Nonspeciest, supra note 50, at 124. Note that some of this research has
resulted in the transformation of some noncriminal harmful acts to the status of criminal.
See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Factsheet, Animal Abuse and Human
Abuse: Partners in Crime, http://www.peta.org/mc/ factsheet_display.asp?ID=132 (last
visited Mar. 28, 2008) (“In March 2006, Maine Governor John Baldacci signed a law—
the first of its kind in the United States—that permits judges to include animal
companions in court-issued protection orders against domestic abusers. Those who harm
animals in violation of a court order can face fines and jail time.”); see also Sharon Kiley
Mack, Law Protects Pets of Abuse Victims, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Apr. 1, 2006, at A1.
164
See, e.g., ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 157 (1987); RICHARD J.
GELLES & MURRAY STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 68, 119 (1998); CLAIRE RENZETTI,
VIOLENT BETRAYAL: PARTNER ABUSE IN LESBIAN RELATIONSHIPS 21 (1992); Phil
Arkow, Child Abuse, Animal Abuse, and the Veterinarian, 204 J. AM. VETERINARY MED.
ASS’N 226, 226–47 (1994); Frank Ascione, Battered Women’s Reports of Their Partners
and Their Children’s Cruelty to Animals, 1 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE 119, 120, 120–33
(1998); Frank Ascione, Teresa M. Thompson & Tracy Black, Childhood Cruelty to
Animals: Assessing Cruelty Dimensions and Motivations, 10 ANTHROZOOS 170, 170–77
(1997); Gary Patronek, Issues for Veterinarians in Recognizing and Reporting Animal
Neglect and Abuse, 5 J. HUM.-ANIMAL STUD. 267 (1997).
165
See Elizabeth Deviney, Jeffery Dickert, and Randall Lockwood, The Care of Pets
Within Child Abusing Families, 4 INT’L J. FOR STUDY ANIMAL PROBS. 321, 321–29
(1983) (finding that 60 percent of more than fifty New Jersey families being treated for
child abuse also had animals in the home who had been abused); People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals, supra note 163.
166
See, e.g., Barbara W. Boat, The Relationship Between Violence to Children and
Violence to Animals: An Ignored Link?, 10 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 229, 229–35
(1995); William N. Friedrich, Anthony J. Urquiza & Robert L. Beiike, Behavior
Problems in Sexually Abused Young Children, 11 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 47, 47–57
160
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(1986); MIC HUNTER, ABUSED BOYS: THE NEGLECTED VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 214,
214–16 (1990).
167
See, e.g., R. VEMON WIEHE, SIBLING ABUSE 44–45 (1990).
168
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, supra note 163; see also MARTIN DALY
& MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE (1988); Beirne, Nonspeciest, supra note 50, at 123; Sara
C. Haden & Angela Scarpa, Childhood Animal Cruelty: A Review of Research,
Assessment, and Therapeutic Issues, FORENSIC EXAMINER, Summer 2005, at 23; Stephen
R. Kellert & Alan R. Felthous, Childhood Cruelty Toward Animals Among Criminals and
Noncriminals, 38 HUM. REL. 1113 (1985); Kenneth White, The Shape of Cruelty,
LATHAM LETTER, Summer 1992, at 6, 6–7; Animal Cruelty; Common in Many Killers,
SUNBURY MACEDON REGIONAL, Apr. 26, 2005, at 3; Paul Bradley & Kiran
Krishnamurthy, Right and Wrong ‘An Illusion’/Psychologist Who Met with Malvo Said
Teen’s Disorder Limited His Moral Judgment, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Dec. 9,
2003, at A7; Ethan Bronner, Terror in Littleton: The Signs; Experts Urge Swift Action To
Fight Depression, Isolation, and Aggression, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1999, at A27; Ruth
Larson, Animal Cruelty May Be a Warning. Often Precedes Harm to Humans, WASH.
TIMES, June 23, 1998, at A7; Tim Potter, BTK Describes His Own Crimes, WICHITA
EAGLE (Wichita, Kan.), July 16, 2005, at 1B; Deborah Sharp, Abuse Will Often Cross
Species Lines, USA TODAY, Apr. 28, 2000, at 3A; Mitchell Zuckoff, Loners Drew Little
Notice, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 22, 1999, at A1; cf. Arnold Arluke & Boria Sax,
Understanding Nazi Animal Protection and the Holocaust, 5 ANTHROZOOS 6 (1992);
Aleksander Lasik, Rudolf Hoss: Manager of Crime, in ANATOMY OF THE AUSCHWITZ
DEATH CAMP 288 (Yisrael Gutman & Michael Berenbaum eds., 1998).
169
See, e.g., Linda Pifer, Kinya Shimizu & Ralph Pifer, Public Attitudes Toward Animal
Research: Some International Comparisons, 2 SOC’Y & ANIMALS 95 (1994); Taylor,
supra note 4, at 558 (“Because of their environmental experiences, the distinction
between environment and social justice is an artificial one for people of color. The
[environmental justice paradigm] encourages its supporters to view the home and
community, work, and play environments as interconnected environments. Therefore,
efforts . . . to isolate and concentrate only on certain aspects of these environments is
anathema to people of color. The practice of focusing on the distant, wild, natural
environs while paying less attention to the people environment is problematic.”).
170
For additional perspectives on how animal abuse and cruelty begets, precipitates, and
signifies human-directed crime, see, for example, David Crary, Program Links Domestic
Abuse, Pets, ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP) NEWSWIRE, Mar. 11, 2001; Man Accused of
Killing Puppy with Ax, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD (Athens, Ga.), Nov. 18, 2003; Man
Charged with Threatening Children, BUCKS COUNTY COURIER TIMES (Bucks County,
Pa.), Feb. 29, 2004, at 8C; Police Remove Children from Filthy House, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (AP) NEWSWIRE, Jun. 17, 2005; Andrea Vance, 10-Year-Old Luke Kicked a Lamb
To Death Like a Football, NEWS WORLD (U.K.), Jan. 23, 2005; Frank R. Ascione,
Children Who Are Cruel to Animals: A Review of Research and Implications for
Developmental Psychopathology, 6 ANTHROZOOS 226 (1993); Frank R. Ascione,
Enhancing Children’s Attitudes About the Humane Treatment of Animals: Generalization
to Human-Directed Empathy, 5 ANTHROZOOS 176 (1992); Ronald Baenninger, Violence
Toward Other Species, in TARGETS OF VIOLENCE AND AGGRESSION 5 (Ronald
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Baenninger ed., 1991); Piers Beirne, The Use and Abuse of Animals in Criminology: A
Brief History and Current Review, SOC. JUST., Spring 1995, at 5; Donna K. Darden &
Steven K. Worden, Marketing Deviance: The Selling of Cockfighting, 4 SOC’Y &
ANIMALS 211 (1996); Alan R. Felthous, Aggression Against Cats, Dogs, and People, 10
CHILD PSYCHOL. & HUM. DEV. 169 (1980); Alan R. Felthous & Stephen R. Kellert,
Childhood Cruelty to Animals and Later Aggression Against People: A Review, 144 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 710 (1987); Paul J. Frick et al., Oppositional Defiant Disorder and
Conduct Disorder: A Meta-Analytic Review of Factor Analyses and Cross-Validation in
a Clinic Sample, 13 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 319 (1993); Karla S. Miller & John F.
Knutson, Reports of Severe Physical Punishment and Exposure to Animal Cruelty by
Inmates Convicted of Felonies and by University Students, 21 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
59 (1997); David R. Offord et al., The Epidemiology of Antisocial Behavior in Childhood
and Adolescence, in THE DEVELOPMENT AND TREATMENT OF CHILDHOOD AGGRESSION
31 (Debra J. Pepler & Kenneth H. Rubin eds., 1991); G.R. Patterson, Barbara D.
DeBaryshe & Elizabeth Ramsey, A Developmental Perspective on Antisocial Behavior,
442 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 329 (1989).
171
Matt Cartmill, Human Uniqueness and Theoretical Content in Paleoanthropology, 11
INT’L J. PRIMATOLOGY 173, 178 (1980).
172
Bendarik, for example, notes that “[t]he issue of disaster preparedness was unlikely to
be in the top twenty concerns of animal advocates [before Hurricane Katrina]. However,
the graphic scenes of distressed people forced to choose between the safety of an
evacuation shelter and staying in their flooded homes with their pets is indelibly etched in
the national psyche.” Bednarik, supra note 51, at 92. With Bednarik’s observations in
mind, one could suggest that Hurricane Katrina was the sort of noncriminal event that
caused the type of harm that both environmental justice advocates and those concerned
with animal abuse and cruelty include within a socio-legal approach/environmental
justice perspective. The suggestion that disaster preparedness may serve as an area in
which environmental justice proponents and animal welfare and rights activists might
share common ground gains some traction from post-Katrina efforts like the Pet
Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006 (PETS), Pub. L. No. 109-308, 120
Stat. 1725 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5196(b) (2006)), which would ensure that
in the event of a major disaster or emergency, government officials will not separate
people from their service and companion animals. See, e.g., Pets Evacuation and
Transportation Standards Act of 2006, available at http://www.animallaw.info/statutes/
stusfd2006pl109_308.htm; Marjorie A. Berger, 2006 Legislative Review, 13 ANIMAL L.
299, 304–06 (2007); Bednarik, supra note 51, at 92; Shays, supra note 57, at 1.
173
See, e.g., Bruce Barcott, From Tree-Hugger to Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 7,
2002, at 16. Note that while the responses to legal harms may be directed at a wide range
of individuals, “[the violence] is aimed at inanimate machines and tools that are
destroying life.” FOREMAN, ECO-WARRIOR, supra note 134; FOREMAN, ECODEFENSE: A
FIELD GUIDE FOR MONKEYWRENCHING (1993) [hereinafter FOREMAN, ECODEFENSE].
174
Lisa Bacon, Rash of Vandalism in Richmond May Be Tied to Environment Group,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2002, at A15 (quoting Craig Rosebraugh, former spokesperson,
ALF and ELF).
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For in-depth discussions of the actions, histories, and philosophies of individuals and
groups involved in such activities, see, for example, FOREMAN, ECO-WARRIOR supra
note 134; FOREMAN, ECODEFENSE, supra note 173; CHRISTOPHER MANES, GREEN
RAGE: RADICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE UNMAKING OF CIVILIZATION (1990);
RIK SCARCE, ECO-WARRIORS: UNDERSTANDING THE RADICAL ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT (1990); TERRORISTS OR FREEDOM FIGHTERS?: REFLECTIONS ON THE
LIBERATION OF ANIMALS (Steven Best & Anthony J. Nocella eds., 2004); SUSAN ZAKIN,
COYOTES AND TOWN DOGS: EARTH FIRST! AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT
(1993).
For recent examples, see, for example, (in chronological order) Bruce Barcott, supra
note 173; Bacon, supra note 174; Fire Destroys Hummers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2003, at
A8; Arrest Made in S.U.V. Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, at 19; Jo Napolitano, Group
Takes Blame for Vandalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at A15; 3 in Environmental
Group Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, at A18; Matthew Preusch, Animal Rights
Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at 12; Adam Liptak, Judge Throws Out U.S. Suit of
Greenpeace, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at A20; Robert Hanley, Animal Rights
Advocates Charged with Making Threats, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2004, at A27; F.B.I.
Warns of Protest Threat, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004, at A11; University Fax Machine
Linked to Ecoterrorism Claim, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2004, at A12; Charges in Animal
Rights Arson, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2004, at A13; Guilty Pleas in Ecoterror Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2004, at A9; Fire May be Tied to Activists, Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
8, 2005, at A15; Frank Eltman, Animal Welfare Activists More Aggressive, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., May 18, 2005, available at http://www.rickross.com/reference/
animal/animal89.html; Timothy Egan, 6 Arrested After Ecoterrorist Acts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 2005, at A18; Michael Janofsky, 11 Indicted in Cases of Environmental
Sabotage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2006, at A1; Environmental Activists Indicted, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at A13; David Kocieniewski, Activists Are Accused of
Championing Animals by Making Targets of People, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2006, at A23;
David Kocieniewski, 6 Animal Rights Advocates Are Convicted of Terrorism, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at A21 [hereinafter Kocieniewski, Convicted]; 14th Indicted in
Ecoterrorist Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at A13; British Animal Rights Protesters
Admit Plotting Against Farmers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2006, at A10; Kirk Johnson, 4 Are
Indicted on Arson Charges in 1998 Fires at a Resort in Vail, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2006,
at A9; Randal C. Archibold, Facing Trial Under Terror Law, Radical Claims a New
Outlook, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2007, at A15; 13-Year Sentence in Ecoterrorism Case,
N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2007, at A14; Mistrial in Ecoterror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
2007, at A15; Khatchadourian, supra note 84, at 56–72; Elizabeth M. Gillespie, Luxury
Homes Burn in Apparent Eco-attack, ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP) NEWSWIRE, Mar. 3, 2008;
William Yardley, Ecoterrorism Suspected in House Fires in Seattle Suburb, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2008, at A16; ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP) NEWSWIRE, National Briefing:
Northwest: Washington: Woman Guilty in 2001 Arson, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2008, at
A11; see also Bednarik, supra note 51, at 92.
Note that these responses to legal harms are not confined to the United States. Such
direct action in the name of the earth and for the sake of the environment have occurred
worldwide. See, e.g., Chrystal Mancuso-Smith, From Monkeywrenching to Mass
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Destruction: Eco-Sabotage and the American West, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
319, 324–25 (2006); see also Gillespie, supra note 84 (describing the struggle of the
people of Bougainville, an island in the Solomon Islands archipelago, to force the closure
of an environmentally destructive copper-mining operation, and asserting that
“Bougainville is the first place in the world where an indigenous people have forced the
closure of a mine that was raping their land and environment, and kept it closed”);
Williams, supra note 18, at 32 (“In Bougainville (Solomon Islands), indigenous people’s
resistance to pollution from copper mining by Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ) included blowing up
electricity pylons, which brought about the closure of the mine. This catalyzed an
independence struggle, which has transmuted into an ongoing conflict with blockades and
a shoot-to-kill policy involving local people, RTZ, the Papuan militia, and the Australian
government. The outcome is in no one’s interests, particularly that of RTZ, which
consequently experienced difficulties in attracting financial backing for other projects.”).
Note also that not all responses to legal harms committed in the name of the
environment or to protect or improve the environment involve vandalism or violence.
For example, “guerrilla gardening” is a form of nonviolent direct action whereby
environmental activists take over or squat on an abandoned piece of land and grow crops
or plants. Although guerrilla gardening may violate local ordinances and laws regarding
trespassing, guerrilla gardeners possess a different purpose than those engaging in
ecodefense, ecotage, or monkeywrenching: by reclaiming and assigning a new purpose to
land perceived as neglected or misused, guerrilla gardeners hope to put the land to a
better use and to engage in a political commentary about land ownership, land rights, and
land reform. But under existing state-defined crime, their actions, like those who
undertake ecodefense, ecotage, or monkeywrenching, may well constitute property
crimes. Similarly, seed bombs or seed grenades—compressed clods of soil containing
seeds or live vegetation, water, and sometimes fertilizer—are sometimes thrown, hurled,
or dropped into or onto abandoned or otherwise neglected lots in an effort to introduce
vegetation and improve the aesthetics of the area. Again, like guerrilla gardening, seed
bombing may technically be against the law, but the tactics and end results differ greatly
from ecodefense, ecotage, or monkeywrenching. See, e.g., AVANT GARDENING:
ECOLOGICAL STRUGGLE IN THE CITY AND THE WORLD (Peter Lamborn & Bill Weinberg
eds., 1999); DAVID TRACEY, GUERRILLA GARDENING: A MANUALFESTO (2007).
176
See, e.g., CRAIG ROSEBRAUGH, BURNING RAGE OF A DYING PLANET: SPEAKING FOR
THE EARTH LIBERATION FRONT (2004).
177
Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Mission Statement, http://www.seashepherd.org/
mission.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2008); see also Khatchadourian, supra note 84, at 56,
58 (describing the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society’s goals “to protect the world’s
marine life from the destructive habits and the voracious appetites of humankind”).
178
Sea Shepherd’s fleet, Neptune’s Navy, is captained by Paul Watson, an original
founder of Greenpeace. See Khatchadourian, supra note 84, at 56.
179
Watson refers to the procedure by which his vessel rams into another’s stern,
“Operation Asshole,” and uses the term steel enema to describe jamming ships in their
slipways. Khatchadourian, supra note 84, at 56, 58, 62. Neptune’s Navy will also pull
up long lines of poachers and engage in net ripping and other activities to impede fishing
vessels or prevent what it considers to be the tragedy of the commons. Id. at 62, 69, 71.
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180

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397. UNCLOS provides that only sovereign states may take action to protect
and preserve the marine environment and that the high seas—the area beyond the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (more than two hundred nautical miles off the coast) is
beyond national jurisdiction and part of the global commons. Id. For an overview of
UNCLOS, see, for example, DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 659–67 (2d ed. 2002); see also
Robin Kundis Craig, Oceans and Estuaries, in STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY,
supra note 33, at 227, 229–31; Khatchadourian, supra note 84, at 56, 58; Low &
Hodgkinson, supra note 30, at 439–41.
181
See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), Dec. 2, 1946, 10
U.S.T. 952, 161 U.N.T.S. 72; see also HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 180, at
977–95; Anthony D’Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life,
85 AM. J. INT’L L. 21, 21-61 (1991); Khatchadourian, supra note 84, at 56, 58.
One particularly controversial issue that has plagued the IWC is its provision for
aboriginal subsistence whaling. For a discussion, see, for example, Anne M. Creason,
Culture Clash: The Influence of Indigenous Cultures on the International Whaling
Regime, 35 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 83 (2004); Alyson Decker, Save the Whales—Save the
Whalers—Wait, Just Save the International Whaling Commission: A Fresh Look at the
Controversy Surrounding Cultural Claims to Whale, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 253
(2006); A.W. Harris, The Best Scientific Evidence Available: The Whaling Moratorium
and Divergent Interpretations of Science, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 375
(2005); Brian Trevor Hodges, The Cracking Façade of the International Whaling
Commission as an Institution of International Law: Norwegian Small-Type Whaling and
the Aboriginal Subsistence Exemption, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 295 (2000); Leesteffy
Jenkins & Cara Romanzo, Makah Whaling: Aboriginal Subsistence or a Stepping Stone
to Undermining the Commercial Whaling Moratorium, 9 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 71 (1998); Diana Wagner, Competing Cultural Interests in the Whaling Debate:
An Exception to the Universality of the Right to Culture, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 831 (2004).
For a recent discussion regarding the Makah and whaling, see, for example, Sarah
Kershaw, In Petition to Government, Tribe Hopes for Return to Whaling Past, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2005, at A12; J. Michael Kennedy, Tribal Group Kills Whale Off
Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2007, at A21; Charges in Whale Killing, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 2007, at A10; ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP) NEWSWIRE, National Briefing:
Northwest: Washington: Plea in Whale Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, at A17; see
also Alx Dark, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, THE MAKAH
WHALE HUNT (1999), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NAE/cases/makah/
index.html.
182
Khatchadourian, supra note 84, at 56–72. A crucial tactic of SSCS is the filming and
generation of publicity surrounding their campaigns. Id.
183
“Members” is placed in quotation marks because ELF, as an anonymous,
decentralized organization and contains no formal membership. Those who engage in
ELF-type activities do so as part of affinity groups, rather than as members of a formally
structured organization. See, e.g., Animal Liberation Front, The ALF Credo and
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Guidelines, http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/alf_credo.htm (last visited
Jan. 5, 2008) (“Because ALF actions may be against the law, activists work
anonymously, either in small groups or individually, and do not have any centralized
organization or coordination. The Animal Liberation Front consists of small autonomous
groups of people all over the world who carry out direct action according to the ALF
guidelines. Any group of people who are vegetarians or vegans and who carry out
actions according to ALF guidelines have the right to regard themselves as part of the
ALF.”); Bacon, supra note 174; Jason Laurendeau & Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Homegrown Brand of Al Qaeda: Moral Panics and the Construction of “Eco-terrorism” (Nov.
3, 2006) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American
Society of Criminology, L.A., Cal., on file with author ); Mancuso-Smith, supra note
175, at 322.
184
See sources cited supra note 173; see also Bednarik, supra note 51, at 92 (“In order to
educate the public and protest the conditions of animals, some animal activists have
trespassed on private property in order to document the horrific living conditions of these
animals.”); Mancuso-Smith, supra note 175, at 322 (discussing how some individuals
hope to “trust environmental issues to the forefront of the public’s attention,” while
others “hope . . . that causing fear and economic damage will scare perceived ‘violators’
into stopping behavior [they] find . . . offensive or harmful”).
For a note on terrorism as a symbolic gesture, see, for example, Easing Anxiety on
Mass Transit, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005, at WK4 (quoting Juliette N. Kayem, terrorism
scholar, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University).
185
See, e.g., Laurendeau & Gibbs Van Brunschot, supra note 183.
186
Animal Liberation Front, supra note 183. See also Egan, supra note 175; Eltman,
supra note 175.
187
Animal Liberation Front, supra note 183.
188
Id.
189
Note that ecodefense is more likely to be applied to activities involving the rescuing or
liberation of animals, whereas ecotage or monkeywrenching are more likely to be used to
refer to measures taken to slow down or halt activities that the “eco-sabateur” or
“monkeywrencher” perceives as destructive (such as development or logging).
190
See, e.g., EDWARD ABBEY, HAYDUKE LIVES! (1991); EDWARD ABBEY, THE MONKEY
WRENCH GANG (1975).
191
See, e.g., RON ARNOLD, ECOTERROR: THE VIOLENT AGENDA TO SAVE NATURE
(1997); Laurendeau & Gibbs Van Brunschot, supra note 183.
According to Rosebraugh,
[i]n the mid-1990s, the term ecoterrorism began to be used to refer to acts of
sabotage committed in defense of the environment. This label was not used
within the environmental movement itself, but rather by mainstream news
media, law enforcement, and politicians, who were acting deliberately to
reduce public support and increase condemnation of such acts. Do acts of
property destruction taken to further the environmental movement constitute a
form of terrorism? It all depends on whom you ask.
ROSEBRAUGH, supra note 176, at 236.
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Note that two commentators use the terms ecoterrorism and eco-extremism
interchangeably to refer to a wide range of phenomena, including environmental laws.
Miller and Miller preach:
[A] new environmental problem has entered the lime light in recent years.
A problem far more dangerous to the present and future of our world than any
pollutant . . . . The problem of eco-terrorism and eco-extremism. Not the
rational environmentalists whom our world needs, the effects of these
individuals can be seen in the crimes some of them commit. In the propaganda
they promote. And in the legislation others propose and enforce. Some ecoextremists secretly or openly cheer when the rights of others are ignored or
violated. Some are blatant criminals. Some are employed by governmental
agencies.
....
In recent years, numerous statutes and regulations have been passed to try to
help protect our environment. Some are implemented in a haphazard manner.
Few, if any, accomplish what they set out to do. Many reflect oppressive and
dictatorial attitudes. And the desire to instill fear and obtain control over
others, regardless of the goals and results. Additionally many eco-laws and
regulations seem to be kept secret from the public until the government begins
turning the wheels of prosecution against an unsuspecting citizen.
....
There is no doubt that environmental laws are out of control.
MILLER & MILLER, supra note 5, at 2–6.
192
See, e.g., The Threat of Eco-Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Forests and
Forest Health, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of James J. Jarboe, Domestic Terrorism
Section Chief, FBI), available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/jarboe021202
.htm; see also ARNOLD, supra note 191; MILLER & MILLER, supra note 5; Laurendeau &
Gibbs Van Brunschot, supra note 183 (explaining that “[i]n recent years, lawenforcement agents, media outlets and corporate spokespersons have employed the term
‘eco-terrorism’ to describe certain kinds of radical environmental actions (especially
those involving destruction of property such as logging machinery, SUVs and luxury
homes),” and stating that the FBI defines “ecoterrorism” as “the use or threatened use of
violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentallyoriented, subnational group for environmental-political reasons, or aimed at an audience
beyond the target, often symbolic in nature”); ROSEBRAUGH, supra note 176, at 238
(“The FBI defines terrorism as ‘the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.’”).
193
See, e.g., Laurendeau & Gibbs Van Brunschot, supra note 183.
194
For example, ecoterrorism has been used to refer to the possible attacks on public
water supplies in the United States. To illustrate, the Public Health Service Act (PHSA),
42 U.S.C. § 300i-2(a)(1) (2006), provides that “[e]ach community water system serving a
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population of greater than 3,300 persons shall conduct an assessment of the vulnerability
of its system to a terrorist attack or other intentional acts intended to substantially disrupt
the ability of the system to provide a safe and reliable supply of drinking water.”
Subsection (b) provides that “[e]ach community water system serving a population
greater than 3,300 shall prepare or revise, where necessary, an emergency response plan
that incorporates the results of vulnerability assessments that have been completed.” Id.
§ 300i-2(b). See generally New Jersey Chemical Rules Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2008,
at B4 (reporting how states may pass laws protecting their residents from attack on
chemical facilities within their borders that are tougher than national standards.). Along
similar lines, ecoterrorism has also been applied to the Iraqi attacks on Kuwaiti oil fields
in the first Gulf War. See Leibler, supra note 137.
For a critique of the word ecoterrorism on the grounds that it generates significant
confusion, see Laurendeau & Gibbs Van Brunschot, supra note 183.
195
Mancuso-Smith, supra note 175, at 322.
196
See Mike Davis, Dead West: Ecocide in Marlboro Country, NEW LEFT REV., July–
Aug. 1993, at 49, 51 (“Peterson’s Troubled Lands and, especially, Feshbach and
Friendly’s Ecocide in the USSR have received spectacular publicity in the American
media. Exploiting the new, uncensored wealth of Russian-language sources, they
describe an environmental crisis of biblical proportions. The former Land of the Soviets
is portrayed as a dystopia of polluted lakes, poisoned crops, toxic cities and sick children.
What Stalinist heavy industry and mindless cotton monoculture have not ruined, the
Soviet military has managed to bomb or irradiate. For Peterson, this ‘ecological
terrorism’ is conclusive proof of the irrationality of a society lacking a market mechanism
to properly ‘value’ nature. Weighing the chances of any environmental clean-up, he
holds out only the grim hope that economic collapse and radical de-industrialization may
rid Russia and Ukraine of their worst polluters.” (citing MURRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED
FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN THE USSR (1992)); D.J. PETERSON, TROUBLED LANDS: THE
LEGACY OF SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION (1993); Nic Groombridge,
Masculinities and Crimes Against the Environment, 2 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 249,
250 (1998) (criticizing how “the censorious discourse of ‘crime’” is more often applied to
those who seek to protect the environment).
Some scholars do not comment directly on the use of the term ecoterrorism, but do
suggest other means of referring to such activities. For example, MacNaughten and Urry
use the term environmental deviance to refer to deviant activities by environmental
activists. MacNaghten & Urry, supra note 153, at 203, 214 (“These new social
movements, often formed as a response to perceived threats of environmental abuse (e.g.
such as ‘Hunt Saboteurs’, ‘Animal Rights’ groups, ‘Earth First’ actions, and other direct
action groups), have effectively moved outside the legitimate sphere of state regulated,
consumer-oriented action[,]. . . what one might call ‘environmental deviance.’”).
Along similar lines, Wee distinguishes between “acts of terror” and “extreme
communicative acts” (ECAs):
It is perhaps a sad indication of the times we live in that one might naturally
ask how the notion of ECA [extreme communicative acts, such as selfimmolation and hunger strikes] might be distinguished from so-called ‘acts of
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terror’ such as suicide bombings. An important feature to bear in mind is that
ECAs involve only harm to the actors themselves, not to any others, and most
certainly not to innocent bystanders. Acts of terror, in contrast, deliberately
target innocents.
Lionel Wee, “Extreme Communicative Acts” and the Boosting of Illocutionary Force, 36
J. PRAGMATICS 2161, 2162 n.3 (2004).
Although Wee does not mention ecoterrorism, his desire to draw a line between ECAs
and acts of terror might signal a similar discomfort with combining responses to legal
harms (ALF/ELF activities) with environmental destruction intended to harm innocent
bystanders (such as contaminating drinking water supplies). Future research might
consider whether it would be appropriate to consider ecodefense, ecotage, and
monkeywrenching as extreme communicative acts.
197
Mancuso-Smith, supra note 175, at 323, 338.
198
ROSEBRAUGH, supra note 176, at 215; see John Jay College Student Work Brigade,
supra note 124 (referring to Hurricane Katrina as “a well-calculated terrorist action that
exposed and magnified the crime against humanity and the genocide that were already
present in New Orleans.”).
As Rosebraugh further articulates:
[E]ven though the FBI calls what the ELF does “terrorism,” it does not mean
that it is terrorism. The ELF has widely publicized guidelines that preclude
any actions that endanger life, human or otherwise. Terrorism is random,
bombs exploding in crowded shopping plazas and actions of that nature.
Terrorism seeks to frighten and demoralize by causing harm or even death. . . .
I had always equated the term terrorism with the threat of or actual injury to
human life. . . . I argued that ecoterrorism to me meant some form of terror that
is caused to the natural environment.
ROSEBRAUGH, supra note 176, at 169, 236, 237.
See, e.g., Mancuso-Smith, supra note 175, at 319, 322, 332 (“[T]he acts of
environmental activists have been swept up in the race to protect Americans from
geopolitically motivated terrorists. . . . Opponents of such tactics deliberately use the term
terrorist in order to capitalize on the general public’s strong negative association with the
word in the hopes of minimizing sympathy for the actors’ cause. . . . Capitalizing on the
post-September 11 momentum in quickly passing legislation under the guise of
protecting Americans from future terrorist attacks, several special interest groups
spearheaded campaigns to rid themselves of their nemeses—the radical environmental
groups.”); see also LEE HALL, CAPERS IN THE CHURCHYARD: ANIMAL RIGHTS
ADVOCACY IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2006); Andrew N. Ireland Moore, Caging Animal
Advocates’ Political Freedoms: The Unconstituionality of the Animal and Ecological
Terrorism Act, 11 ANIMAL L. 255, 261 (2005) (“The events of September 11, 2001
triggered a strong response to terrorism in the United States.”). See GARLAND, supra
note 125, at 64 (“[H]ostility towards the criminal helps promote solidarity and love
between the citizens.” (citing George Herbert Mead, The Psychology of Punitive Justice,
199
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23 AM. J. SOC. 577, 577–602 (1918)); Joni Seager, supra note 8, at 60 (“All militaries
use national security as an excuse for their activities and as a cloak of secrecy.”).
200
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006); see also Berger, supra note
172, at 300–03; Tricia Engelhardt, Foiling the Man in the Ski Mask Holding a Bunny
Rabbit: Putting a Stop to Radical Animal Activism with Animal and Ecological Terrorism
Bills, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 1041, 1056–57 (2007); Kocieniewski, supra note 175; Mary
Ann Liebert, Law Against Animal Rights Extremism Strengthened, 26 BIOTECHNOLOGY
L. REP. 30, 30 (2007); Ariel Meyerstein, The Law and Lawyers as Enemy Combatants, 18
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 299, 364 n.296 (2007).
Note that the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-346, 106
Stat. 928, was the precursor to the AETA. See Kathy Hessler, Mediating Animal Law
Matters, 2 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 21, 42 n.54 (2007); Alyson B. Walker, A Field of
Failed Dreams: Problems Passing Effective Ecoterrorism Legislation, 18 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 99 (2007).
201
Environmental Terrorism Reduction Act, H.R. 2583, 107th Cong. (2001) (introduced
by Rep. Darlene Hooley (D-OR)). The stated purpose of this legislation was “[t]o
establish a national clearinghouse for information on incidents of environmental terrorism
and to establish a program to reduce environmental terrorism.” Id. The bill was
introduced again in the 108th Congress, but it never became law. See GovTrack.us, H.R.
2583 [107th]: Environmental Terrorism Reduction Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=h107-2583 (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). Sessions of Congress last two
years, and at the end of each session all proposed bills and resolutions that have not
passed are cleared from the books. Id.
Note that the Racketeering Influenced and Corruption Organizations (RICO) Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (1994), and the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act,
Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at 8, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 28, 31, 42,
47, 49, 50 U.S.C. (2006)), have both been used to curb ecodefense/ecotage/monkey
wrenching.
For a discussion of the application of RICO to ecodefense/ecotage/monkeywrenching,
see, for example, Xavier Beltran, Applying RICO to Eco-Activism: Fanning the Radical
Flames of Eco-Terror, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 281 (2002); William W. Cason,
Comment, Spiking the Spikers: The Use of Civil RICO Against Environmental Terrorists,
32 HOUS. L. REV. 745 (1995); Mancuso-Smith, supra note 175, at 330–31.
For a discussion of the application of the USA PATRIOT Act to
ecodefense/ecotage/monkeywrenching, see, for example, Dennis R. Case, The USA
PATRIOT Act: Adding Bite to the Fight Against Animal Rights Terrorism?, 34 RUTGERS
L.J. 187 (2002); Mancuso-Smith, supra note 175, at 329–30.
202
AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, ANIMAL AND ECOLOGICAL TERRORISM IN AMERICA
(Sandy Liddy Bourne & Matthew McNabb eds., 2003), available at
http://www.alec.org/meSWFiles/pdf/AnimalandEcologicalTerrorismin America.pdf; see
also Ireland Moore, supra note 199; Mancuso-Smith, supra note 175, at 319, 332–34.
203
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3311(a) (2002) ; see also Pennsylvania Governor Signs
Ecoterrorism Bill into Law, LEGAL ACTION NEWS, Apr. 16, 2006, http://www.p86.net/
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pennsylvania_governor_signs_ecoterrorism_bill_into_bjdc.aspx; Bednarik, supra note
51, at 92; Engelhardt, supra note 200, at 1055–56.
204
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3311(b) (2002); see also Bednarik, supra note 51, at 92;
Engelhardt, supra note 200, at 1055–56; Pennsylvania Governor Signs Ecoterrorism Bill
into Law, supra note 203.
Note that 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8319 (2002) provides for civil actions for any
individual aggrieved by the offense of ecoterrorism as defined in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §
3311(a) (2002). See generally Mancuso-Smith, supra note 175, at 333–34 (discussing
H.B. 213, 189th Gen. Assem. (PENN. 2005) (codified at 18 PA. CONS. ST. §§ 3311, 8319
(2006))).
205
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 901.511 (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2923.31 (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 2, §§ 5-103–5-106 (2008); see also Engelhardt,
supra note 200, at 1053–59 (discussing legislation in Arizona, Ohio, and Washington);
Ireland Moore, supra note 199, at 276–77 (discussing successful efforts in Ohio and
Oklahoma; model AETA-type legislation that died in committee in Hawaii, Missouri,
Texas, and Washington; and legislation pending in committees in New York and South
Carolina); Mancuso-Smith, supra note 175, at 333–34 (discussing Kansas and Oregon);
see ROSEBRAUGH, supra note 176, at 214 (discussing Maine’s Act to Deter
Environmental Terrorism in the State, as well as measures in Oregon and Washington).
206
Gillespie, supra note 84.
207
See Williams, supra note 18, at 16.
208
Robert J. Brulle & David Naguib Pellow, The Future of Environmental Justice
Movements, in POWER, JUSTICE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 294
[hereinafter Brulle & Pellow, Future]; cf. Laurendeau & Gibbs Van Brunschot, supra
note 183 (“[P]art of the strategic benefit of extreme action is that it makes other forms of
activism more palatable to the general public.”).
209
Khatchadourian, supra note 84, at 56, 68 (quoting Paul Watson). Note that not all
media refer to ELF and other radical environmentalists in negative terms. Indeed, the
journal Earth First! reports favorably on ecodefense and monkeywrenching on a monthly
basis. For a list of sources referring to ELF and other radical environmentalists in
“benign” terms, see Laurendeau & Gibbs Van Brunschot, supra note 183.
210
Note that in some situations—especially in highly contentious controversies
surrounding zoning and development, as well as environmental protection and animal
rights—corporations, industries, other businesses, development firms, and operations
have turned to Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) to deter both
mainstream and radical environmental activists from speaking out against various public
issues. SLAPPs—“civil court action[s] which allege[] that injury has been caused by the
efforts of non-government individuals or organizations to influence government action on
. . . issue[s] of public interest or concern”—aim to harass, intimidate, and distract
activists from their cause and prevent community-minded individuals from voice their
concerns.
SHARON BEDER, GLOBAL SPIN: THE CORPORATE ASSAULT ON
ENVIRONMENTALISM 64, 71 (2002). While a SLAPP must rest on some technical legal
ground such as libel, defamation, conspiracy, nuisance, invasion of privacy, or
interference with business or economic expectancy (i.e., business damages claims), and
while the supermajority of SLAPPs are dismissed by courts, SLAPPs can “shift the
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balance of power, giving the firm filing the SLAPP suit the upper hand when they are
losing in the political arena.” Id. at 64, 66. As Bender explains, one of the “effect[s] of
the SLAPP is to distract the key antagonists from the main controversy and use up their
money, time and energy in the courtroom, where the real issues are not discussed.
Activists use the political arena to expand the debate, enrol citizens on their side and
spread the conflict. The firms and developers that utilize SLAPPs are trying to subvert
and circumvent that political process ‘by enlisting judicial power against their
opponents.’” Id. at 66.
It should be understood that “[t]he target of [SLAPPs] are generally not radical
environmentalists, nor professional activists: they are ordinary middle-class citizens who
are concerned about their local environment and have no history of political activity.
This concentration on middle-class citizens is no accident. They often have the most to
lose, and don’t have the support and ideological commitment that a professional
environmentalist in a large environmental organization usually has.” Id. at 66–67.
Several states (California, Florida, Nevada, New York, and Washington) have introduced
SLAPP-deterring legislation, so that individuals who are SLAPPed can SLAPP back (i.e.,
can sue in return on the grounds of abuse of the legal process, malicious prosecution, or
interference with the exercise of constitutional rights of free expression). SLAPPs are
less frequent outside the United States, in large part because the United States is unique
in granting citizens access to government and the courts with respect to regulation
formation and decisions that affect the environment. Id. at 73, 69. SLAPPs have proven
an effective means for those responding to legal harms—those acts or omissions that may
not constitute a violation of an existing form of law, but which result in or possess the
potential to result in environmental and human harm. See id. at 62–74; see also Beltran,
supra note 201, at 301; White, Imagination, supra note 5, at 498.
It also bears mention that in other parts of the world, environmental activists—both
those that have engaged in ecodefense/ecotage/monkeywrenching, and those that have
elected to employ less aggressive forms of resistance—have been subject to assault,
victimization, and murder. Examples include Ken Saro-Wiwa, Dorothy Stang, and
Kinkri Devi. For a discussion of the murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other environmental
activists who opposed oil pollution caused by Shell in Nigeria see, for example,
Williams, supra note 18, at 32; KLEIN, supra note 18, at 331, 339, 383–85, 392–93, 417,
418, 419, 445. For details of the murder of Dorothy Stang, an American nun and
advocate for rain forest protection in Brazil, see, for example, Larry Rohter, Brazil
Promises Crackdown After Nun’s Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005, at A3;
First Arrest Made in Nun’s Slaying in Amazon, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2005, at A9;
Editorial, Sister Dorothy’s Killers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at A24; Brazil Farmer
Held in Killing of Nun, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at A7; Editorial, The Amazon at Risk,
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2005, at A18; Editorial, A Healthier Amazon Jungle, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2005, at A28; David Stang & Marguerite Stang Hohm, Letter to the Editor,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, at WK11; Larry Rohter, Brazil’s Lofty Promises After Nun’s
Killing Prove Hollow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005, at A3; Supporters of Slain American
Nun Vow To Pursue Planners of Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, at A13; see also All
Things Considered: Interview by Melissa Block with Sister Mary Alice McCabe, Sisters
of Notre Dame de Namur (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 15, 2005) (discussing the murder of
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Sister Dorothy Stang in Brazil and the violence in the Amazon over land disputes). For a
description of Kinkri Devi’s fight against illegal mining and quarrying in the northern
Indian state of Himachal Pradesh and the death threats she received from quarry owners,
see, for example, Haresh Pandya, Kinkri Devi Is Dead at 82; Fought Illegal Mining in
India, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2008, at 25.
211
Gillespie, supra note 84.
212
See Sean E. Michael, R. Bruce Hull & Diane L. Zahm, Environmental Factors
Influencing Auto Burglary: A Case Study, 22 ENV’T & BEHAV. 368, 369 (2001).
213
Mike Maguire, Crime Data and Statistics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINOLOGY 241, 247 (Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan & Robert Reiner eds., 4th ed.
2007).
214
CULLEN & AGNEW, supra note 23, at 427.
215
Mike Maguire, supra note 213, at 247.
216
White, for example, uses the term environmental criminology in a very different way
than those who use it to describe the study of the spatial aspects of crime. White’s paper,
Environmental Criminology and Sydney Water, sets forth “a political economy of
environmental harm—that is, an appreciation of the economic and political relationships
which shape the way in which human beings interrelate with the natural world, including
water.” White, Sydney Water, supra note 13, at 214. White contends that “adequate
study of environmental harm must proceed from sustained analysis of the basic
institutions and structures of late capitalism,” and concludes his article by stating,
From the point of view of environmental criminology, a number of tasks
suggest themselves. One is to explicate the way in which the phenomenon is
being defined as an environmental and criminological issue, and how ‘harm’ is
being construed in philosophical and legal terms. Another is to explore the
limitations of existing regulatory machinery, which encompasses corporate,
administrative and environmental legal dimensions, among others.
Id. at 218.
217
Groombridge, for example, contends that environmental criminology, in the sense of
“the analyses of the relationship between place, crime and offending” might be better
called “topographical criminology,” and that a “genuine environmental criminology”
should be more than just the “criminology of place” or MacNaghten and Urry’s
“environmental deviance,” noted above. See Groombridge, supra note 196, at 251–52,
264.
Similarly, South bemoans the use of term environmental criminology to refer to
studies of place and “the spatial patterning of crime” and notes that criminological
investigations of animal rights and “the symbiosis between human societies and
ecological systems” render problematic the restrictive use of the term environmental
criminology. South, supra note 8, at 212.
218
Michael, Hull & Zahm, supra note 212, at 370.
219
Id. at 374–77.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 378–79.
222
Id. at 379–80.
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223

Id. at 380. According to Michael, Hull & Zahm, “environmental features enabling an
examine act are critical. Cars parked in places without accessible examination areas are
much less likely to be burglarized.” Id.
224
Id. at 380.
225
Id. at 380–81.
226
Id. at 372, 382.
227
Id. at 370, 382, 385.
228
See, e.g., CULLEN & AGNEW, supra note 23, at 430.
229
See, e.g., CULLEN & AGNEW, supra note 23, at 430; Michael, Hull & Zahm, supra
note 212, at 384.
For a brief overview of the impact of environmental design on crime, see, for example,
Adam Crawford, Crime Prevention and Community Safety, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF CRIMINOLOGY supra note 213, at 875–76; Joel McCormick, Designing Against Crime,
PARKS & RECREATION, May 2006, at 34, available at http://www.nrpa.org/content/
default.aspx?documentId=4205; Blue Ridge Community College, Trees and Crime: The
Role of Landscape in Crime Prevention, http://www1.brcc.edu/murray/research/cpted/
(last visited Apr.28, 2008). For more in-depth considerations, see, for example, ALICE
COLEMAN, UTOPIA ON TRIAL (1985); ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY (Paul J.
Brantingham & Patricia L. Brantingham eds., 1981); G. HUGHES, CRIME AND
COMMUNITY (2006); C. R. JEFFERY, CRIME PREVENITON THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL
DESIGN (1971); Paul J. Brantingham & Patricia L. Brantingham, Nodes, Paths, and
Edges: Considerations on the Complexity of Crime and the Physical Environment, 13 J.
ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 3 (1993); Ronald V. Clarke, “Situational” Crime Prevention: Theory
and Practice, 20 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 136 (1980).
230
Michael, Hull & Zahm, supra note 212, at 370.
231
Id. at 377, 382.
232
See id. at 369. In a slightly different way, Richard Louv suggests another way in
which vegetation can affect crime:
Covered by vegetation—native grass or even trees—[greenroofs] provide
protection from UV rays, clean the air, control storm-water runoff, aid birds
and butterflies, and cool homes in summer and insulate them in winter. The
higher initial cost of such a roof is outweighed by its longevity. From above,
the green looks like an expanse of fields. Increasingly, architects incorporate
construction requirements for ‘greenwalls’ of ivy and other plants, which
naturalize a building and prevent graffiti.
RICHARD LOUV, LAST CHILD IN THE WOODS: SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM NATUREDEFICIT DISORDER 246 (2006).
233
See, e.g., Rebekah Levine Coley, Frances E. Kuo & William C. Sullivan, Where Does
Community Grow?: The Social Context Created by Nature in Urban Public Housing, 29
ENV’T & BEHAV. 468 (1997); Frances E. Kuo & William C. Sullivan, Aggression and
Violence in the Inner City: Effects of Environment via Mental Fatigue, 33 ENV’T &
BEHAV. 543 (2001); Frances E. Kuo, Coping with Poverty: Impacts of Enviroment and
Attention in the Inner City, 33 ENV’T & BEHAV. 5 (2001); Frances E. Kuo & William C.
Sullivan, Environment and Crime in the Inner City: Does Vegetation Reduce Crime?, 33
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ENV’T & BEHAV. 343, 345 (May 2001); Frances E. Kuo et al., Fertile Ground for
Community: Inner-City Neighborhood Common Spaces, 26 AM. J. COMMUNITY
PSYCHOL. 823 (1998); Frances E. Kuo, Magdalena Bacaicoa & William C. Sullivan,
Transforming Inner-City Landscapes: Trees, Sense of Safety, and Preference 30 ENV’T &
BEHAV. 28 (1998); Byoung-Suk Kweon, William C. Sullivan & Angela R. Wiley, Green
Common Spaces and the Social Integration of Inner-City Older Adults, 30 ENV’T &
BEHAV. 832 (1998).
For an overview of the research at the Human-Environment Research Laboratory, see
Brisman, Values, supra note 2, at 400–05.
234
Michael, Hull & Zahm note that almost 5 percent of all violent crimes reported in the
United States take place in parks and other outdoor places but conclude that while
“environmental features are used by offenders to support their criminal activities in parks
. . . [v]egetation removal . . . may not disrupt the offender’s routine.” See Michael, Hull
& Zahm, supra note 212, at 369, 383, 385.
235
See CULLEN & AGNEW, supra note 23, at 430; see also LOUV, supra note 232, at 177
(mentioning how access to public parks and recreational facilities has been linked to
reductions in crime and juvenile delinquency).
To their credit, Michael, Hull & Zahm do acknowledge the potential negative effects
of removing vegetation and the work of some of the researchers at the HumanEnvironment Research Laboratory. See Michael, Hull & Zahm, supra note 212, at 384.
Two other environment-crime relationships bear mention here, one arising out of the
negative impacts of the environment on crime, the other involving the positive impact of
environment on crime. With respect to the former, some researchers have asserted
correlations between exposure to lead and negative affects on brain functioning, leading
to learning disabilities, hyperactivity, and attention deficit disorder and increasing the risk
of antisocial, delinquent, and/or criminal behavior. See, e.g., RESEARCH LINKS
CHILDHOOD LEAD EXPOSURE TO CHANGES IN VIOLENT CRIME RATES THROUGHOUT
THE 20TH
CENTURY, available at http://www.icfi.com/Markets/Community_
Development/doc_files/LeadExposureStudy.pdf; see also Jascha Hoffman, Criminal
Element: Was Getting the Lead Out of Gasoline a Factor in the Drop in Crime?, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Oct. 21, 2006, at 32 (discussing the October 2007 research of Reyes and
Nevin); Rick Nevin, Understanding International Crime Trends: The Legacy of
Preschool Lead Exposure, 104 ENVTL. RES. 315 (2007); cf. Williams, supra note 18, at
29. For an overview of studies on lead toxicity and aggressive behavior, see, for
example, VOLD, BERNARD & SNIPES, supra note 128, at 84, 85, 321, 323. For
observations on other metal exposures to crime, see Gillespie, supra note 84. Note that
because racial minorities are disproportionately impacted by environmental health
hazards, overemphasis on lead exposure as a prediction of violent crime may run the risk
of correlating race and crime.
With respect to the latter, a significant number of researchers have examined the
positive effects of outdoor green common spaces on human behavior and functioning.
For a discussion of the therapeutic benefits of gardening, especially in urban
environments, see, for example, Rachel Kaplan, Some Psychological Benefits of
Gardening, 5 ENV’T & BEHAV. 145 (1973); Rachel Kaplan & Stephen Kaplan,
Preference, Restoration, and Meaningful Action in the Context of Nearby Nature, in
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URBAN PLACE: RECONNECTING WITH THE NATURAL WORLD 271, 288–90 (Peggy F.
Barlett ed., 2005) [hereinafter URBAN PLACE]; RACHEL KAPLAN & STEPHEN KAPLAN,
THE EXPERIENCE OF NATURE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1989); Barbara
Deutsch Lynch & Rima Brusi, Nature, Memory, and Nation: New York’s Latino Gardens
and Casitas, in URBAN PLACE, supra at 191, 192–94 (noting the therapeutic effects of
cultivation, in general, and to the New York City Latino population, in particular);
Catherine McGuinn & Paula Diane Relf, A Profile of Juvenile Offenders in a Vocational
Horticulture Curriculum, 11 HORTTECHNOLOGY 427, 430, 433 (2001) (noting the
success of horticulture rehabilitation-vocational training programs); Susan M. Stuart,
Lifting Spirits: Creating Gardens in California Domestic Violence Shelters, in URBAN
PLACE, supra at 61, 85 (describing the psychosocial and therapeutic benefits of gardening
to residents and staff of grassroots domestic violence shelters in California); Malve von
Hassell, Community Gardens in New York City: Place, Community, and Individuality, in
URBAN PLACE, supra at 91, 92 (describing community gardens not only as green space
but as providing opportunities for community life, education, and political action). For a
discussion of gardening activities as a drug and crime prevention strategy, see, for
example, Rabyn Ratliff, J.L. Newbern Students Take Part in Learning Tree Project,
VALDOSTA DAILY TIMES (Valdosta, Ga.), July 26, 2007; Troy Teasures: Sixth Avenue
Neighborhood, RECORD (Troy, N.Y.), Mar. 23, 2003.
236
See Michael, Hull & Zahm, supra note 212, at 370.
237
See, e.g., Brenda Goodman, Killing of a Young Hiker Puts North Georgia on Edge,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2008, at A12.
238
This is not to suggest that individuals do not ever fear crime in urban parks. See, e.g.,
LOUV, supra note 232, at 144 (noting how some children fear neighborhood parks
controlled by gangs).
For a discussion of a different kind of fear and safety in urban parks, see, for example,
Allison Arieff, Danger: Playground Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at A19
(commenting on growing concerns about injury at playgrounds).
239
LOUV, supra note 232, at 128–29.
240
Id. at 144.
241
As Louv argues,
Most children today are hard-pressed to develop a sense of wonder, to
induce what Berenson called the “spirit of place” while playing video games or
trapped inside a house because of fear of crime. Asked to name their favorite
special places, children often describe their room or an attic—somewhere
quiet.
....
Fear is the most potent force that prevents parents from allowing their
children the freedom they themselves enjoyed when they were young. Fear is
the emotion that separates a developing child from the full, essential benefits
of nature. Fear of traffic, of crime, of stranger-danger—and of nature itself.
Id. at 95, 123.
242
See Brisman, Values, supra note 2, at 400 n.572, 403 n.580 and accompanying text.
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243

LOUV, supra note 232, at 127–28. See generally JAY LIVINGSTON, CRIME &
CRIMINOLOGY 16 (2d ed. 1996) (describing how the fear of crime causes damage to
social life).
244
For an in-depth analysis of the fear of crime, its origins, its importance, the role of the
media in its construction, and its effects on the politics of law and order, see
LIVINGSTON, supra note 243, at 12–49; see also Lauer, supra note 148, at 154–57
(distinguishing the fear of crime from crime rates and stating that “‘fear of crime,’ as
opposed to actual rates of victimization, did not exist as an articulated social problem
until the late 1960s, and it soon became a popular index for assessing the civic health of
the nation. . . . [C]ontrary to commonsense assumptions, fear of crime often exceeds the
actual risk of personal harm.”). For recent notes about fear of crime in the news, see, for
example, Jake Mooney, Crime Is Low, but Fear Knows No Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2007, at C41; Ben Schott, Who Do You Think We Are?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2007, at
WK15.
Note that fear of crime is similar to fear of terrorism or fear of a terrorist attack:
“continual fear of terrorism is a strain on the social fabric. . . . People become reluctant to
even get together when public spaces are turned into fortified zones.” John Tierney,
Living in Fear and Paying a High Cost in Heart Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, at D1.
For a recent study finding that the post-September 11, 2001, fear of terrorism has resulted
in increased diagnoses of cardiovascular ailments, see E. Alison Holman et al.,
Terrorism, Acute Stress, and Cardiovascular Health, 65 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 73
(2008).
245
Avi Brisman, Double Whammy: Collateral Consequences of Conviction and
Imprisonment for Sustainable Communities and the Environment, 28 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 423, 431, 456–62 (2004). For additional support for the
proposition that crime may affect inner city residents’ decisions to relocate, see, for
example, PIETRO S. NIVOLA, LAWS OF THE LANDSCAPE: HOW POLICIES SHAPE CITIES IN
EUROPE AND AMERICA 7, 71 (1999) (“[B]usinessmen frequently identify crime as the
major impediment to locating in the inner city. . . . [T]here is simply no way this country
can end the headlong retreat of families and firms from . . . cities without an even sharper
and sustained reduction in their levels of violence.”); see also Julie Berry Cullen &
Steven D. Levitt, Crime, Urban Flight, and the Consequences for Cities, 81 REV. ECON.
& STATS. 159, 159–60 (1999) (examining the relationship between crime and urban flight
across three different data sets and concluding that (1) for every reported central city
crime there is a net decline of approximately one city resident; (2) almost all of the crimerelated impact on falling city population is the result of individuals leaving the city (outmigration) rather than a decline in new arrivals (in-migration); and (3) highly educated
households and households with children are most responsive to crime; there is little
difference between blacks and whites); WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER & DECLINE:
CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 18–20 (1990)
(concluding, based on studies of forty neighborhoods in eight cities, that crime rates
affect individuals’ attitudes towards their neighborhoods and their decisions to relocate);
cf. Vitello, supra note 41, § 14:1, 6 (noting that crime ranks second to noise as the top
neighborhood complaint and reason for individuals to consider moving). For a relatively
recent study of the linkages between crime and population change in central cities and
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their suburbs, see Joong-Hwan Oh, A Dynamic Approach to Population Change in
Central Cities and Their Suburbs, 1980-1990, 64 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 663 (2005).
Within these sprawling suburbs, individuals may opt for gated communities, which
can adversely affect the level of social interaction between individuals—a point discussed
in the text above. See Jonathan Simon, Guns, Crime, & Governance, 39 HOUS. L. REV.
133, 139 (2002) (citing David J. Kennedy, Note, Residential Associations as State
Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J.
761, 765 (1995) (“The dominant motivation for moving into gated communities is fear of
crime and frustration at perceived government failure to deal with it.”)).
246
See generally William Buzbee, Sprawl’s Political-Economy and the Case for a
Metropolitan Green Space Initiative, 32 URB. LAW. 367, 368–69, 372 (2000) (“Unlike
more dense urban forms where residents use mass transit and do much of their travel and
shopping on foot, suburban living leads to fewer random interactions with strangers and
neighbors. This greater predictability and insularity of suburban living is, of course, part
of suburbia’s attraction for many citizens. . . . [S]prawling growth often leaves behind
increasingly impoverished central urban areas, destroys green space, converts agricultural
land to residential or business use, and contributes to deteriorating air pollution as
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